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Message from the Editors
 
In 2008, the U.S. Naval War College established the Center on 
Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary 
mission is twofold: to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular Warfare 
into the Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula; and 
to bring operators, practitioners, and scholars together to share their 
knowledge and experiences about a vast array of violent and non-
violent irregular challenges. This case study is part of an ongoing effort 
at CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by world-renowned 
academics, case studies, research papers, articles, and books. Our aim is 
to make these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive curriculum 
that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet the challenges of 
the post-9/11 world. 
In many ways 2015 is shaping up to be a pivotal year for 
irregular warfare: the withdrawal of U.S. general-purpose forces from 
Afghanistan is fraught with political and operational challenges; 
President Obama refocused U.S. efforts on challenges from armed 
groups in the Middle East and Africa’s Trans-Sahel region in his May 
2014 speech at West Point; and the rise of ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq 
and Levant) has redefined U.S. priorities. These three events, together 
with the continuing budget issues facing the U.S. Department of 
Defense and concerns about waning public support for U.S. military 
operations overseas, help to frame the future face of irregular warfare 
challenges going forward. These events also make this case study on 
influence operations particularly timely and important, since the 
“influence operations mindset” advocated in this case study is 
particularly suited to smaller-footprint, persistent-presence operations 
that Special Operations Forces will be tasked with in the future. 
Lieutenant Colonel Edward M. Lopacienski (USA) and Major 
Thomas Scanzillo (USA) are the authors of this case study, which 
developed out of research papers from the U.S. Naval War College and 
Naval Postgraduate School. The case study addresses a common 
problem: how to influence the human domain—a local population—as 
part of a strategic plan. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command 
strategic document ARSOF 2022 places particular emphasis on the 
 ii 
human domain, which is amplified in this case study. As the authors 
argue, successful influence operations such as those carried out in 
support of the strategic aims of Joint Special Operations Task Force – 
Philippines (JSOTF-P) between 2004–2008 can undermine support for 
an adversary, disrupt their operations and strategies, prevent 
recruitment and logistical support, and ensure that the adversary does 
not receive sanctuary and support in the future. Moreover, as new 
threats from armed groups continue to emerge around the world, there 
is a strong demand signal for in-depth analysis of successful influence 
operations from a variety of cases, including JSOTF-P. 
The challenge in crafting and implementing effective influence 
operations that influence this human domain is threefold. The first is 
how to clearly define influence operations. The argument that 
Lopacienski and Scanzillo make is that the commonly misrepresented 
and ambiguous term “Information Operations” does not 
comprehensively or adequately address the scope of such operations. 
Instead they propose and clearly define a new joint doctrinal term – 
Influence Operations. Influence Operations builds on existing joint 
doctrine and skill sets and does not require expensive new technology 
or weapons platforms. Instead, the authors argue, it is about adopting a 
particular mindset and applying core skill sets for which Special 
Operations Forces such as Army Special Forces, Psychological 
Operations, Naval Special Warfare, Civil Affairs teams, and Marine 
Special Operations units are selected for and are trained to achieve. 
The second challenge is practical and operational: how to 
integrate multiple lines of operation to support and capitalize on 
Influence Operations. Common phrases such as “the population is the 
center of gravity” and “winning hearts and minds” can be interpreted 
and applied in many different ways. The question is: what are the 
operators’ roles, and how does an operator “do” Influence 
Operations?  
The authors argue for a straightforward approach: to focus the 
preponderance of efforts on influencing the human domain and 
integrating multiple lines of operation to include capacity building, 
civil-military engagement, information engagement, and intelligence 
support operations into that single focus. All activities are carried out 
 iii 
with the purpose of “influencing the population” in order to achieve the 
goals of the task force or theater commander. The presented examples 
of success display aspects of joint and combined SOF operations whose 




The third challenge is to identify what conditions make 
influence operations a success (or failure) and whether those conditions 
are specific to a time and place or can be more generalizable. The 
examples in this case come from the authors’ experiences in JSOTF-P 
and focus on two armed groups: Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and 
Jema’ah Islamiy’ah (JI). Using a snapshot of examples from 2004–
2008, the authors found that as local attitudes began to change, the two 
armed groups began to lose varying degrees of support and influence. 
Eventually, local people began to make a conscious choice to accept 
the positive change offered by the Armed Forces of the Philippines and 
JSOTF-P efforts, with commitments to increase the process as the 
people helped secure the island. As a result, more and more people 
chose not to continue to house the ASG and JI, which would entail 
enduring insufficient health care, income, and security. Although the 
authors are quick to point out that the struggle continues to this day, it 
is one that favors the efforts of the AFP and JSOTF-P.  
It is also important to note four critical caveats to this case 
study. First, the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the 
authors and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense, 
the Naval War College, or CIWAG. Second, while every effort was 
made to correct any factual errors in this work, the authors are 
ultimately responsible for the content of this case study.  
Third, this is just one approach to dealing with human domain 
issues. The argument Lopacienski and Scanzillo make in this case is 
that clear definitions, a clear understanding of how lines of operations 
support the overarching goals, and an examination of various examples 
                                                        
1
 MAJ Edward Lopacienski, “SOF and the Use of Influence Operations to 
Defeat Terrorists and Insurgents in the Southern Philippines,” Collective 
Papers for the Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, Academic Year 
2010-2011. 
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of success and failure can provide the starting place for an Influence 
Operations mindset to grow and develop. Moreover, the authors are 
very clear that their framework is not meant to be conclusive or 
exclusive; rather, it is meant to be a starting point for current operators 
to consider when conducting their own Influence Operations. As 
always, it is up to the practitioners and operators to adapt this 
framework and others to suit their specific environment and conditions. 
Fourth, the study questions presented in all CIWAG case 
studies are written to provoke discussion on a wide variety of topics, 
including strategic, operational, and tactical matters, as well as ethical 
and moral questions confronted by operators in the battlefield. The 
point is to make these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive 
curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet the 
challenges of the post-9/11 world and to show them the dilemmas that 
real people have faced in high-pressure situations.  
Finally, in addition to a range of teaching questions that are 
intended to serve as the foundation for classroom discussion, students 
conducting further research will find the extensive bibliography at the 
end of the case helpful. Compiled by the case study authors and by 
CIWAG researchers at the Naval War College, the bibliography is a 
selection of the best books and articles on a range of related topics. We 
hope you find it useful and look forward to hearing your feedback on 
the cases and suggestions for how you can contribute to the Center on 
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 Thom Shanker, “U.S. Counterinsurgency Unit to Stay in Philippines,” Coin 
Central, NY Times, August 20, 2009, 
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Central Mindanao & 
Autonomous Region of 
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM): 
MILF- & MNLF-controlled 
territory 
Jolo Island and primary AO for 
ASG and key JI leadership in the 
Philippines, as well a 






Wars among the people that emphasize influencing 
population groups rather than an exclusive emphasis on 




Because guerilla warfare basically drives from the masses 
and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it 





As the nature of contemporary warfare continues to evolve 
geographically, demographically, and politically, it is increasingly 
crucial for commanders and staffs conducting full-spectrum 
counterinsurgency operations to truly understand the complexity of the 
operating environment and to employ forces and assets in a predictive 
and multispectral manner. In wars that are irregular in character, in 
which armed groups recruit from, hide among, and are willing to attack 
communities, the nature of the conflict is a fight for the population.
5
 In 
these environments, the preponderance of effort must be focused on 
influencing the population more effectively than the adversary.
6
 This is 
the fight for the human domain.  
                                                        
3
 US Army Special Operations Command, ARSOF 2022, p. 8. 
4
 Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith 
(Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 46. 
5
 Irregular war is defined as violent struggles among state and non-state actors 
for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations. (DODD 3000.07, 
December 1, 2008) 
6
 As defined across political-military milieus, including the U.S. Army Special 
Forces manuals for unconventional warfare (UW), irregular warfare (IW), 
foreign internal defense (FID), and counterinsurgency operations (COIN). The 
civilian center of gravity role is likewise defined by counterinsurgency 
theorists David Galula and Roger Trinquier, as well as by insurgency theorist 
3 
 
The human domain includes the physical, cultural, and social 
environments that combine to influence human behavior.
7
 Our ability 
to achieve successful influence depends on how much we are willing to 
learn about the human terrain, in combination with the type of 
relationships that we and our adversary establish with the people who 
reside throughout the human domain.
 8
 Success will be determined by 
our ability to overcome our outsider status—most often through local 
partnerships—allowing us to operate equal to or better than the 
adversary. Achieving this takes an investment in time, the 
establishment of trust, and an understanding of the people to effectively 




This case study addresses the segment of Operations Enduring 
Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P) history that spans July 2004 through 
July 2008. It discusses the synergized efforts to use Influence 
Operations to change the socio-cultural environment by disrupting the 
tactical and operational advantage of two armed groups: the Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jema’ah Islamiy’ah (JI). As local attitudes 
began to change, the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jema’ah Islamiy’ah began 
to lose varying degrees of support and influence. Influence of the 
population boiled down to the population making a choice: Choose the 
positive change being offered by the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP) and U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) efforts with 
commitments to increase the process as the people help secure the 
island; or continue to house the ASG and JI and endure the existing 
conditions of insufficient health care, income, security, and more. As 
credibility began to shift in favor of the AFP/U.S. presence, the once-
                                                                                                                         
and former Communist Premier of the People’s Republic of China Mao Tse-
Tung.  
7
 Roulo, Claudette, American Forces Press Service, “McRaven: Success in 
Human Domain Fundamental to Special Ops,” June 5, 2013, 








hostile population began to change from a predominantly belligerent 
status to a more favorable disposition. Although the mission continues 
to this day, it is one favoring the efforts of the AFP and U.S. The 
presented examples of success display aspects of joint and combined 
SOF operations whose methods affected the civilian populace, terrorist 
leaders, and insurgent forces.
10
 
This case study uses our collective operational experiences and 
research to illustrate the application of successful SOF interdependence 
using our methodology of SF/PSYOP interoperability in JSOTF-P. It 
proposes a joint doctrinal term for “Influence Operations” and 
highlights JSOTF-P methods as a model for successful application in 
confronting insurgencies in the human domain.  
 
Note: The authors of this paper limit their analysis to their own 
experiences and the four-year time frame 2004 to 2008. This is not 
intended to be a comprehensive assessment of all aspects of the JSOTF-
P, nor is it intended to represent all perspectives or experiences. The 
authors also note that our SOF, DoD, and interagency brethren who 
continue to operate successfully throughout the world have used similar 
methods. More articles and studies are needed to capture their insights 
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 MAJ Edward Lopacienski, “SOF and the Use of Influence Operations to 
Defeat Terrorists and Insurgents in the Southern Philippines,” Collective 




I. The Foundations of Influence Operations 
 
When those crosshairs line up on a soldier and that teenager 
sees a U.S. or Filipino flag on the sleeve, he will hesitate, 
remembering all of the good that the Philippines Security 
Forces and Americans have brought. That hesitation is the 
effect we are trying to achieve, as we have truly penetrated 
the thought processes of the insurgents and sown the seeds of 




The argument in this case study is that Influence Operations
12
 
can play an important role in winning the fight against radical 
insurgents and aligning the population with the legitimate, responsible, 
and recognized government.
13
 As the US and its allies continue to face 
these kinds of challenges around the world, it is vital to consider many 
different examples of how influence operations have been successful 
used and what lessons we can learn from those experience. This raises 
some important questions, which include: How can SOF employ 
Influence Operations to disrupt or subvert terrorist or insurgent centers 
of gravity at the tactical or operational levels?  
 
 
                                                        
11
 COL James Linder, during a conversation with the authors in the 
Philippines, November 2005.  
12
 Information Operations (IO) is a combination of, or unilaterally executed, 
operations conducted by psychological operations (PSYOP), public affairs 
(PA), electronic warfare (EW), operations security (OPSEC), computer 
network operations (CNO), and military deception (MILDEC), for purposes of 
supporting or conducting military operations. Only one of the Information 
Operation LOE specialties is required to operate with regional expertise 
(PSYOP), but all of them can and do operate across varied operational 
paradigms. 
13
 Inversely, the legitimate government must maintain its social contract with 
the population, remaining aware of how fragile the newly gained trust will 
remain for years to come. 
6 
 
The argument in this case is that Special warfare provides 
direction for the application of Influence Operations.
14 
Moreover, when 
applied correctly and with sufficient resources, SOF Influence 
Operations are perhaps the most effective and sustainable means to 
marginalize and defeat terrorist and insurgent operations. The effective 
implementation of special warfare requires a synergetic approach by 
SOF and conventional forces working with and through host nation 
forces.
15
 Indeed, Influence Operations are the downrange application of 
special warfare in today’s environment of operations in the human 
domain.  
In order to understand some of the advantages of and 
challenges to successfully carrying out influence operations, this case 
study looks at influence operations through the perspective of 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, PHILIPPINES (OEF-P), which is 
an economy-of-force operation that relies on the deliberately 
synchronized efforts and expertise of joint, multinational, and 
interagency partners. The U.S. ambassador, the JSOTF-P commander, 
the Philippine government, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP) share common strategic and regional goals and focused on 
maximizing cooperation and progress—everyone “rows together” 
toward the shared ultimate goals of regional stability and long-term 
effective partnerships.  
One of the first lessons we noted from our research was that 
above all, achieving successful and sustainable results takes willing 
partners, the right force, excruciating patience, and time—more time 
than most commanders and politicians have the patience or tenure for. 
Moreover, developing the mindset for successful influence operations 
is an art that can only be learned by a willing mind and applied by those 
                                                        
14
 Special warfare, as defined in ARSOF 2022, is “the execution of activities 
that involve a combination of lethal and non-lethal actions taken by specially 
trained and educated forces that have a deep understanding of cultures and 
foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, subversion, sabotage and 
the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a 
permissive, uncertain or hostile environment.” 
15
 Lopacienski, “SOF,” 2010. 
7 
 
who recognize that constant change is the only certain factor. In 
addition, putting influence operations key tenants into practice requires 
consistency and leadership commitment.  
In this case example, COL James Linder, the commander of 
JSOTF-P in 2005-2006, began achieving these effects by reinforcing 
the mindset of patience and influence within his own task force, rather 
than using primarily kinetic solutions. His initial guidance to JSOTF-P 
focused efforts not mainly on the insurgents but on children between 
the ages of 6 and 12, as well as women. He believed that the older 
children had, for the most part, made up their minds about the 
Philippine government and what ideologies they believed. COL Linder 
recognized that the Philippine government, with U.S. assistance, was in 
a protracted fight to influence the younger generation over the course of 
several years through a deliberate campaign of positive messages and 
actions across a large geographic and demographically diverse area.  
Building Philippine government and security forces’ legitimacy 
was vital to improving their perception so the population would no 
longer view them with suspicion, but see them as public servants who 
serve and protect citizens. This is not a new concept—indeed the C18th 
French writer Jean-Jaques Rousseau was talking about just this 
principle when he wrote about a “social contract” between a people and 
its government.
16
 In this case, we can see a US commander, COL 
Linder took the doctrinal term of Information Operations (IO) and told 
his people to think of IO as “Influencing Others.”
17
 This mindset took 
hold and became the mantra of JSOTF-P Influence Operations from 
2006 to 2010. Indeed, COL Linder noted that 10 years into his strategy, 
when one of those children becomes a teenager who has bought into 
radical propaganda and been led astray, he will be looking through a 
sniper scope at U.S. or Philippine security forces. He told his task 
force: “When those crosshairs line up on a soldier and that teenager 
sees a U.S. or Filipino flag on the sleeve, he will hesitate, remembering 
all of the good that the Philippine security forces and Americans have 
                                                        
16





brought. That hesitation is the effect we are trying to achieve, as we 
have truly penetrated the thought processes of the insurgents and sown 




A. Definitions and Clarifications 
It is critical to delineate between Information Operations and 
Influence Operations. In the current organizational and doctrinal 
design, Information Operations (IO) is defined as a parallel 
coordinating function between the maneuver commander, U.S. military 
information executors, and the commander’s operational staff.
19
 Joint 
Doctrine defines IO as: 
 
the integrated employment of the core capabilities of 
electronic warfare, computer network operations, 
psychological operations, military deception, and operations 
security, in concert with specified supporting and related 
capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial 





The argument in this case is that the current concept of 
Information Operations is deficient and obfuscates the role of a 
command’s Information Operations staff function with the Information 
                                                        
18
 COL James Linder, during a conversation with the authors in the 
Philippines, November 2005.  
19
 Information Operations (IO) is a combination of, or unilaterally executed, 
operations conducted by psychological operations (PSYOP), public affairs 
(PA), electronic warfare (EW), operations security (OPSEC), computer 
network operations (CNO), and military deception (MILDEC), for purposes of 
supporting or conducting military operations. Only one of the Information 
Operation LOE specialties is required to operate with regional expertise 
(PSYOP), but all of them can and do operate across varied operational 
paradigms.  
20
 Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information 
Operations. Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Second Draft (Washington, DC: 
CJCS, 14 December 2004), GL-12. 
9 
 
Operations line of operation (LOO). The Information Operations LOO 
is executed by a diverse set of forces unique in their highly specialized 
fields. As an example, Army Special Operations’ psychological 
operations forces are the DoD’s subject matter experts in influencing 
mass foreign audiences; electronic warfare is the Army and DoD’s 
force dedicated to protecting and exploiting the electromagnetic 
spectrum of the battlefield; computer network operations focus on the 
cyber spectrum; public affairs is an information provider for the 
American public; military deception is an operational function along 
with operational security; and the mere presence of U.S. forces on the 
ground creates an influence effect through their daily duties and 
operations. The Information Operations staff is charged with 
coordinating or deconflicting all of the effects and activities between 
these unique fields of expertise as a type of information air-traffic 
controller. The crux of the confusion comes from intermingling the IO 
terminology and IO staff positions responsible for coordinating 
operational security, military deception plans, and information 
narratives with the command’s Information Operations subject matter 
experts and operators from psychological operations, computer network 
operations, electronic warfare, military deception, and combat forces 
who are assigned specific missions to develop influence effects.  
In 2009, RAND defined Influence Operations as: 
 
the coordinated, integrated, and synchronized application of 
national diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and 
other capabilities in peacetime, crisis, conflict, and post-
conflict to foster attitudes, behaviors, or decisions by foreign 




However, this broad definition is not all-encompassing. While 
it is theoretically sound, it remains focused at the strategic level and 
                                                        
21
 RAND Corporation, “Foundations of Effective Influence Operations,” 2009, 
p. 2. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG654.pdf, 
accessed October 12, 2010. 
10 
 
emphasizes mass communications, thereby overlooking the critical 
operational and tactical aspects of Influence Operations and special 
warfare that are essential for achieving strategic objectives.  
To alleviate the confusion, the current “IO” LOO should be 
redesignated as the “Influence Operations” LOO. Influence Operations 
is specific in the role and importance of positively affecting the local 
and wider populations in order to successfully isolate and eliminate 
insurgents and terrorists that destabilize local communities and a 
country’s national leadership institutions. Currently, there is no 
standard accepted joint force doctrinal definition of influence 
operations, although Joint Doctrinal Publication 3-0 says: 
 
Focused at the local and community levels, [Influence 
Operations] shape operational conditions by fostering 
changes in the behavior, attitudes, civil dispositions, and 
operating environments across targeted social groups, 




We further argue the following: 
 
Influence Operations regularly identify and adapt to evolving 
conditions within the targeted audiences’ social structure at 
an interpersonal level. These operations use both physical and 
nonphysical methods of persuasion to affect conditions across 
diverse and complex socio-political networks to generate 
advantageous behavior, perceptions, and attitude changes. 
Ultimately, these methods shape the operating environment 
                                                        
22
 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.130 Army Special 




by achieving desired effects to enable US and partner nation 




Army Special Forces and psychological operations forces are 
special operations forces uniquely suited for Influence Operations by 
nature of their distinct regional specialization and design to execute 
missions within and across complex cultural and social domains in 
strategically and politically sensitive regions of the world.
24
 The most 
important critical factor to enduring success is the effective cooperation 
between the involved joint, interagency, and multinational partners. All 
stakeholders must understand the desired end state, the collective tasks, 
the operation goals, and the capabilities and limitations of the collective 
effort. Each player must additionally understand that every action (or 
failure to act) has an influence effect— whether intentional or 
unintentional—on one or more of the target audiences. Whether or not 
friendly actions are intended to have psychological, emotional, or 
cognitive effects
25
 on the population, government, security forces, or 
other audience, every action undoubtedly has a positive or negative 
incremental impact. Therefore, all executors of Influence Operations 
must proactively and cognitively manage actions, messages, and 
perceptions at all times. More importantly, in addition to political and 
cultural awareness, leaders must understand the greatest needs, 
interests, and desires of the population, as well as those of the 
adversary.  
                                                        
23
 Lopacienski, Hoke, Carr, Grieshaber, Influence Operations: Redefining the 
Indirect Approach, Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA, June 2011, 5. 
24
 There is an innate influence effect, whether deliberate or circumstantial, in 
any military operation. For instance, deploying a BCT of the 82
nd
 ABN DIV is 
a military operation designed to change the behavior of, or render ineffective, 
a belligerent or hostile force. However, the influence effects on the population 
and any other relevant party are circumstantial and will typically have 
disparate (i.e. unsynchronized) second and third order effects.  
25
 David Kilcullen, in a 2007 NOETIC brief, delineates popular perception into 
the emotive (“hearts”) component and the cognitive (“minds”) component. 
12 
 
Influence Operations offers a holistic approach to shaping the 
environment of the human domain while simultaneously undermining 
the adversary’s ability to do the same. Influence Operations and 
influence effects must be continuously analyzed and interwoven into all 
activities in an operation or campaign. In general, the overall theme of 
an operation creates a common purpose to shape or change behaviors 
and attitudes toward the desired end state, enables precise and 
minimally invasive combat actions, and alleviates the need for 
prolonged or expanded military actions. Furthermore, Influence 
Operations are proactive in nature and must adapt to the daily effects of 
friendly forces, the enemy, and the population.  
 
B. The Human Domain: Competing for Attitudes, Perceptions, and 
a Vocal Majority 
In irregular and unconventional warfare, everything revolves 
around the competition for people, perceptions, and their support. The 
French counterinsurgency theorist Roger Trinquier said, “The sine qua 
non of victory in [insurgent/counterinsurgent] warfare is the 
unconditional support of the people.”
26
 A counterinsurgency fight is 
entirely a struggle for influence in order to achieve the ultimate 
objective. Gordon McCormick breaks down the “mobilizable 
population” into three distinct categories: “core supporters of the state, 
core supporters of the insurgency, and a large middle group of 
individuals who are prepared to support one side or the other depending 
on the circumstances of the struggle.”
27
 The latter are the fence sitters 
weighing the cost and benefit of aligning with one side or the other. 
This group is the focal point of the influence struggle.  
The first two groups are generally ideologically driven and are 
highly unlikely to change sides. For the core supporters of the state, a 
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 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, 
trans., Daniel Lee (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), 8. 
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 Gordon H. McCormick & Frank Giordano, “The Dynamics of Insurgency,” 
paper presented to the Insurgency Board of Experts, Department of Defense 
Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2002. 
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specialized U.S. task force conducting Influence Operations and 
working with host-nation forces generally provides the host 
government with the resources, training, and/or support that is most 
appropriate for the operating environment. This assumes that Influence 
Operations are in support of a legitimate and recognized government. 
Furthermore, success becomes increasingly difficult to synchronize, 
conduct, and achieve desired effects as the expeditionary force grows 
beyond a single specialized and unified command. To address the core 
supporters of the insurgency, the ideologically driven “hardliners” who 
are unlikely to change, the task force must apply an indirect approach 
(short of unilateral kinetic operations) to disrupt, deny, or otherwise 
prohibit their extreme actions and behavior that may alienate the third 
population group from the legitimate government.  
That large middle group, the impressionable majority of the 
population, becomes the focal point in a struggle between the 
insurgents and counterinsurgents for decisive influence. Many in this 
group will have an initial preference toward one side, but the side they 
choose to support depends on the “expected costs and benefits of their 
alternatives.”
28
 Influencing that choice is a decisive opportunity and 
requires the collaborative will and resources of counterinsurgent forces 
to engage the population over the long term, often within the 
population’s communities. 
One need only look as far as the successes brought forth by the 
Viet Cong’s influence campaign in rural South Vietnam villages, or 
how Hezbollah is infecting the urban and rural populations of Lebanon. 
Consider the narrative example well-known in the Army’s SOF 
community—the “ball of rice” scenario.
29
 A remote rural farmer is 
barely able to scrape enough food together to feed his family and 
livestock. What little income he has goes to providing for his family 
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 Gordon H. McCormick, “Things Come Together,” Third World Quarterly, 
Vol. 28, No. 2, 2007, 301. 
29
 This narrative is Special Forces institutional lore, and most SF candidates 
are exposed to vignettes like this throughout the Special Forces Qualification 
Course. It is recalled in the authors’ own words. 
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and bringing his harvest to the nearest market. One day a man 
approaches him with some money (more than he would make in a 
season), food for his family, and a rifle. The man tells the farmer, “If 
you join our group, we will provide a ball of rice for each of your 
family members every day for as long as you are a member.” The 
farmer says that he does not know of this group nor does he wish to 
fight, but the man reassures him that the rifle can also be used for the 
protection of his family and crops, and that the likelihood of ever 
fighting is very low. The farmer agrees and becomes obligated as a full-
fledged, armed member of an anti-government insurgent group.  
That group influenced him to join by exploiting his needs and 
isolation. He weighed the cost—the small chance he might have to pick 
up his rifle and fight—with the benefit of guaranteed food for his 
family, one of his greatest needs. The insurgents established a basic 
relationship with the farmer, making it easy to further manipulate his 
actions on the basis of whatever cause they hold. This anecdotal 
example highlights events transpiring throughout the underdeveloped 
regions of the world.  
Insurgent groups are well-placed to recognize the needs of a 
targeted population and sway or compel them to support “the cause.” 
On a macro scale, the concepts are routinely similar, and our 
contemporary adversaries are savvy at influencing the large middle 
group of fence sitters before the host government or a coalition of 
forces are in place to prevent it. Successful Influence Operations 
recognizes the criticality of popular support and bases every decision, 





II. Joint Special Operations Task Force – 
Philippines (JSOTF-P) Method of Engagement 
 
Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, 
and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security 
objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and 





The Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines 
(JSOTF-P) has, through significant trial and error, mastered the 
synergetic approach to influencing the target population with a low cost 
and a small footprint. Its successes directly support both U.S. mission 
and USPACOM theater security cooperation plan goals in the 
Philippines. One of the most important factors that have enabled its 
continuing success has been its flexibility: the entire mission is a 
choreographed effort in which every element has a specific function in 
the operating environment and must be guided, surged, or withdrawn at 
any given time to apply appropriate pressure at the appropriate time and 
place. Influence Operations are broken down and interwoven into each 
specific and mutually supportive LOO, and each LOO ultimately 
supports the operational goal of winning the support of the population 
through superior influence. It is also important to remember that the 
adversary gets a vote; some threat groups in the Philippines proved 
surprisingly adept at the same type of influential tactics, so it is 
important to understand their goals and methods in attempting to 
achieve influence superiority.
31
 For example, the Abu Sayyaf Group, 
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 U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities 
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 Century Defense, January 2012, p. 3, 
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planning and execution of OEF-P operations, entails conducting Influence 
Operations (as defined in this case study) more effectively than an adversary. 
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Jema’ah Islamiy’ah, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front have active 
recruiting campaigns that highlight, or even misrepresent, any actions 
of the Philippine government that cause hardship to the people of 
Mindanao.
32
 Consequently, these groups exploit the discontent they 
generate to contribute to national and regional instability. (See 
Appendix A: Threat Groups in the Philippines for more information 
about these groups.)  
 
The acme of skill of the true warrior is to be victorious 
without fighting. –Sun Tzu 
 
In 2006 the commander of Special Operations Command, 
Pacific, Lieutenant General David P. Fridovich, asserted, “We think 
there’s a model here worth showcasing . . . there’s another way of 
doing business.”
33
 During a time of more kinetic solutions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, LTG Fridovich highlighted JSOTF-P’s highly 
effective alternative approach to rooting out terrorists and winning the 
support of the population by, through, and with a willing host nation. 
JSOTF-P is an economy-of-force mission that relies on unity of effort 
between joint, multinational, and interagency partners. The task force 
works closely with the U.S. mission in the Philippines to ensure the 
deconfliction and accomplishment of U.S. regional goals and provide a 
mutually beneficial relationship at all levels. All participants recognize 
the importance of the “whole government” approach and generally 
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strive toward achieving mid- to long-term goals without stereotypical 
political infighting. JSOTF-P practices centralized planning and 
decentralized execution. The commanders and staff understand how to 
most effectively employ each component of the task force, which is 
critical when flexing a particular capability forward to support or 
execute a mission, or preempt or respond to an incident. There are also 
strong cultural bonds and relationships (both positive and negative) 
between each of the numerous subcultures that must be accounted for 
throughout engagements with local population groups. 
One of the strongest core values within JSOTF-P is the overall 
adherence to the first SOF principle: Understand your operating 
environment. Although Influence Operations are not necessarily SOF-
specific, Special Operations Forces are typically the best suited to 
coordinate and conduct deliberate influence efforts, especially in areas 
of operations not engaged in large-scale combat operations. The 
requirement is not for SOF soldiers; rather it is for adaptable soldiers.
34
 
Over the past decade, several military unit types (including general 
purpose forces) proved remarkably capable of adapting and operating 
within influence-centric operational environments, but this is outside of 
their traditional operational focus. SOF is traditionally the force of 
choice when adaptation, ambiguity, and political sensitivities are 
critical, as is typically the case in special warfare environments.  
JSOTF-P created a dynamic influence operations working 
group that regularly met to analyze feedback-driven mission 
requirements, ongoing projects, future opportunities and past and 
projected effects of friendly actions. The construct of the working 
group was comprehensive, and generally run by the JSOTF-P 
Operations Officer (J3) and the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 
Detachment Commander, who typically doubled as the JSOTF J39. 
                                                        
34
  John A. Nagl, who has written extensively about counterinsurgency, notes: 
“Not all soldiers can adapt, and putting those who cannot in command of a 
counterinsurgency effort is counterproductive.” John A. Nagl, “Foreword,” in 
David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, 
CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), x. 
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While the working group met twice a week, or when needed based on 
mission requirements, there was a smaller standing Influence Cell 
consisting of the J3, J39, J2, PSYOP Commander, Civil Affairs Liaison 
Officer (CA LNO), and Public Affairs Officer (PAO) that met almost 
daily. This cell constantly ensured that the coalition messages 
propagated and were appropriately incorporated along each LOO. The 
cell was critical to predictive analysis, managing operations within the 
information environment, and synchronizing all lines of operation. 
JSOTF-P utilized four LOOs: capacity building, civil-military 
engagement, information engagement, and intelligence support 
operations. All contributed to the overall influence campaign, and are 
based on proven strategies that had measurable effects.
35
 The maneuver 
elements (SF, NSW, PSYOP, civil affairs, and eventually MARSOC) 
coordinated their activities based on ground situational awareness 
combined with analysis provided by the influence operation fusion cell. 
The influence operations fusion cell synchronized ongoing influence 
activities and continuously assessed successes in shaping the 
operational environment for future targeting. 
The primary target audience for JSOTF-P’s Influence 
Operations was the diverse Philippine population within the joint 
operations area. Secondary audiences included local Philippine 
government officials, Philippine security forces, and the Philippine 
population not directly affected or targeted by the insurgents. JSOTF-
P’s vocal and widely publicized purpose as it engaged local Filipino 
communities was as follows:  
 
In the fight against terrorism, the JSOTF-P assists the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines in bringing peace and prosperity in 
Mindanao. [We are here to] help strengthen security forces, 
set the conditions for good governance, defeat terrorist 
organizations, and protect U.S. and Philippine citizens from 
terrorist attacks. At the invitation of the Philippine 
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Government, the United States is here to assist the Armed 





The phrase “as they create a secure and stable environment” 
was particularly significant. It remains critical for the Filipino 
population to see their own government in the lead, which makes 
enhancing the Philippine Security Forces’ capacity to operate 
autonomously and more effectively a primary JSOTF-P mission. 
 
A. Capacity Building  
The Armed Forces of the Philippines had difficulty overcoming 
their reputation as an oppressive and heavy-handed force. U.S. forces 
generally hold the moral high ground and are predominantly perceived 
as a force for peace that respects the rule of law. Early in the execution 
of OEF-P, several teams reported that local populations throughout the  
joint operations area in Mindanao were wary, even untrusting, of the 
AFP based on past incidents or word of mouth rumors of AFP violence 
against the Muslim populations.
37
 When U.S. advisors were present for 
community activities, the local Filipinos were much more comfortable 
engaging with both U.S. and Philippine soldiers. The U.S. presence 
enabled the AFP and Philippine National Police (PNP) to engage the 
population and reverse the negative perceptions and biases.
38
  
JSOTF-P explains capacity building as the following: 




 This was illustrated in several Commander’s Comments of SFODA 
SITREPs to JSOTF-P throughout the first few years of Operation Enduring 
Freedom – Philippines. It is important for the reader to understand that this 
was not the case throughout the entire Philippines, and that the AFP was well 
respected in most areas even during that time. The affected areas referred to 
herein are generally those that contain the “relevant population,” or the 
population from which various secessionist groups may draw support. 
38
 Maintaining legitimacy and effective access to the population requires a 
professional force, and all JSOTF-P operational elements are chartered with 




training the Philippine military and national police to fight 
lawlessness. Villagers lived in fear of kidnap-for-ransom 
gangs and other criminal acts, but now live in a more secure 
and peaceful environment. This increased capability provides 
improved security and allows the AFP and PNP to increase 




The themes and messages of the overall influence campaign 
were constantly interwoven into each capacity building event. For 
instance, a U.S. element training a group of Filipino Scout Rangers 
constantly reinforced to them their legitimacy and professional duty 
throughout the course. The same message was applied to a different 
target audience, the population, when that same group of Scout Rangers 
delivered several boxes of books to a rural school. This exemplified 
JSOTF-P’s deliberate influence acts and influence messaging. The 
perception is that the AFP has delivered much-needed books to the 
school, which is probably in an area vulnerable to insurgent 
recruitment. The books, meanwhile, may have come from USAID or 
any other number of sources external to the task force. 
JSOTF-P also encourages other U.S. government efforts to 
reinforce their Influence Operations. For example, when USPACOM 
coordinates for theater security cooperation plan events in the 
Philippines, JSOTF-P has the lead in bringing them to the joint 
operations area. This maximizes training benefits and operational 
effects in specific areas, but it also enables JSOTF-P to utilize those 
events where they will provide the greatest influence effect. For 
example, all services conduct joint/combined exchange training events 
with their Filipino counterparts, to include Army Special Forces, Navy 
SEALs, Marine Special Operations Teams, PSYOP teams, DEA, FBI, 
and other security and police agencies. This is a coordinated effort to 
increase the professional capacity of each Philippine agency to operate 
                                                        
39
 JSOTF-P promotional video, 2008. 
21 
 
both in an autonomous capacity, and in a more interoperable manner 
within their government.
40
 Once the government is able to effectively 
communicate within itself, it can begin to effectively engage the 
population in the form of humanitarian support and civil-military 
engagement. 
 
B. Civil-Military Engagement 
Providing basic human needs further legitimizes the 
government and aids in positively influencing a malleable population. 
Backed by U.S. assistance and resources, the AFP and PNP bring civil 
infrastructure and humanitarian support to the people who need it most. 
This primarily comes in the form of free medical, dental, veterinary, 
and engineering assistance to communities in need. AFP and JSOTF-P 
PSYOP detachments produce materials stating, “Aside from providing 
security [the AFP is] armed with the tools and resources to rebuild 
schools and hospitals, provide medical and dental care, and provide 
fresh water.”
41
 The method of application begins with a targeting 
process to identify which communities are most vulnerable to a 
particular threat or hostile influence. The next step is a planning 
process that incorporates the Philippine Security Forces and local 
leaders (building capacity and strengthening the bond between the 
government and the people). The AFP and JSOTF-P focus civil-
military engagement support on permissive and semi-permissive 
communities that are supportive and amiable to the Philippine 
government and resist the insurgents’ push toward lawlessness. The 
overall desired effect is to build a cascading shift in favor of Philippine 
government, ultimately affecting non-permissive communities.  
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One of the more effective CME venues is the annual 
Balikatan
42
 exercise and its respective capacity-building, CME, 
PSYOP, and U.S. embassy strategic communication activities. 
Balikatan is an Influence Operation unto itself that directly supports the 
JSOTF-P lines of operation. Philippine security forces are in the lead 
when it comes to engaging the population, with U.S. forces providing 
significant material and personnel support. This increases Philippine 
government and AFP legitimacy in the eyes of the Philippine 
population. JSOTF-P also employs some special longer-duration 
programs, often with U.S. Embassy support, to teach vocational skills 
to local communities. These efforts generate income, increase 
prosperity, and influence communities to support the government. Most 
successful Filipino military leaders have adopted the same philosophy 
over the past several years, as illustrated by the AFP’s SALA’AM 
Program.
43
 It has become standard practice to integrate CME into 
nearly every AFP operation in Mindanao. 
The message to the people resonated: “Reject violence and 
embrace peace, and good things will come to your village.”
44
 
Historically, the Abu Sayyaf Group conducted retribution attacks on 
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communities that supported government-led peace initiatives, 
especially those that involved American support. These tactics quickly 
backfired, and increased the momentum and perseverance of AFP and 
JSOTF-P soft power. A new paradigm emerged as ASG threats began 
to lose influence. The ASG learned that if they attacked civil-military 
projects it would cost them access and support of the local population, 
thereby “forcing the enemy to collaborate in its own defeat.”
45
 
Furthermore, many of the families of ASG members belonged to those 
communities and would not refuse free treatment. For the AFP, this 
was an opportunity to show these families and sympathizers first-hand 
that the government cared about them, a demonstration not replicable 
by the Abu Sayyaf Group. It was also an opportunity to engage the 
people on a personal level, thereby allowing effective Influence 
Operations, community relationships, and productive information 
exchange among a willing and supportive population. 
 
C. Information Engagement and Psychological Operations 
The cooperation and support of a population is integral to 
gathering the intelligence needed to weed out insurgents and render 
them ineffective. Establishing a productive and collaborative 
connection between the government and the people is vital to 
conducting effective operations. However, maintaining the connection 
between those two entities is often the challenge. The primary 
executors of JSOTF-P’s influence LOO were the AFP’s and JSOTF-P’s 
PSYOP, civil affairs, special forces, naval special warfare, MARSOC, 
and medical assistance elements. To maintain the attention of, access 
to, and support from the population during Influence Operations, the 
task force required constant dialogue to reinforce PSYOP themes and 
messages. Providing a deliberate range and amount of influential 
information to target audiences and local populations increased two-
way dialogue. The most basic benefits occurred when people 
understood what the government was doing in their communities and 
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developed a desire to support those efforts. In response, the government 
and task force gained otherwise unattainable information about social 
dynamics, attitudes, and insurgent activities, while elements of the 
insurgency began to question their own leadership and decision 
making. This facilitated government actions to marginalize or remove 
the insurgents as the population continued to receive civil-military 
assistance and other benefits from NGOs and community support 
functions.  
The influence messaging process gained momentum and drove 
a wedge further between the population and the insurgent groups. 
PSYOP themes and messages reached the population through a broad 
array of meda including radio, television, social events, flyers, posters, 
text messages, and other social media. The JSOTF-P PSYOP 
detachment employed these meda and methods through four primary 





D. PSYOP: A Core SOF Capability  
Our PSYOP detachment established four key PSYOP LOEs to 
shape JSOTF-P’s influence environment and affect the insurgents’ 
ability to operate. Due to their methods of engagement within 
numerous local communities, as well as their access to senior U.S. and 
AFP senior leadership (political, civilian, and military), the PSYOP and 
civil affairs forces often possessed more access, placement, and trust 
with local community leadership and had unique access to informal 
persons of influence within the population. This was due in no small 
part to collaboration and coordination with the SF and NSW teams that 
lived and worked with the AFP throughout specific priority areas. The 
ability of the PSYOP and civil affairs teams to directly engage with the 
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wider population increased the credibility and access of the other SOF 
teams assigned to work with the AFP throughout key areas of interest. 
The first PSYOP LOE supported JSOTF-P’s civil-military 
engagement by personalizing AFP and JSOTF-P support to local 
communities. The second PSYOP LOE was focused on disrupting 
insurgent operations by creating dissent among the insurgents as well 
as between the insurgents and the communities that traditionally 
supported or tolerated them. The third major PSYOP LOE was the 
Rewards for Justice Campaign. This LOE identified the most heinous 
insurgent leaders, offered rewards leading to their arrest, and, more 
importantly, made personal connections between the atrocities 
committed and the insurgent leaders responsible for them.  JSOTF-P’s 
fourth PSYOP LOE – the Mass Media Campaign – provided 
operational-level influence support to the task force as a whole and 
galvanized all three previous PSYOP LOEs together through an 
extensive and overt commercial multimedia campaign. 
To facilitate change in the populations’ perceptions, enable 
favorable behavior toward AFP and U.S. forces, and build intolerance 
toward the ASG-JI, the PSYOP LOEs were persistently interwoven 
into all of JSOTF-P’s operations. Civil-military engagement provided a 
series of successful events (i.e., deeds) that validated JSOTF-P’s 
influence messaging. Creating dissent within and between the two 
insurgent groups and the populace was dependent on fostering trust and 
developing favorable options for the affected people, thereby providing 
a viable and desirable alternative to living with an insurgent presence. 
AFP and JSOTF’s civil-military engagement was the first layer in 
disrupting ASG and JI access and freedom of movement by providing 
basic health care and much-needed civil projects for afflicted 
communities in need.  
A unique aspect of JSOTF-P’s influence messaging was the 
primacy of using CME and face-to-face engagements to validate the 
influence messages instead of employing reactive messages to address 
events after they occurred. Once a local influence foundation was 
established, PSYOP managed a reciprocal message-deed, deed-
message cycle that became mutually supporting and validating for the 
26 
 
AFP and U.S. civil-military efforts. The messages were routinely 
adapted to inform local villages and population groups about projects, 
why the AFP and U.S. were providing them, and, more importantly, 
demonstrate a long-term local investment in the community by the 
Philippine government.  
The tailored messages and the interpersonal engagements 
supporting them was a systematic and less aggressive approach toward 
gaining populace support and alienating ASG and JI fighters, versus the 
more straightforward practice of directing or telling a population to 
support the government’s endeavors. For example, the AFP and 
JSOTF-P conducted and enabled events to rebuild schools, establish 
clean water wells, provide basic medical and dental care, develop 
roads, and even host veterinary clinics for local farm animals. The 
PSYOP detachment participated in these events to capture the positive 
changes taking place through pictures and casual conversations with 
community members. PSYOP soldiers then used images and 
information to personalize these stories in imagery, media, and print 
products that were disseminated back into the affected and neighboring 
communities to prolong the lasting effects of the AFP and JSOTF-P 
missions taking place across the region. 
Communities on the periphery of these efforts also received the 
products (both verbal and nonverbal) to further spread the influence 
effects and to create demand for similar civil-military assistance into 
previously inaccessible communities. Although the imagery was 
personalized to each local community, the general theme remained the 
same: the AFP and U.S. forces can continue the good work of the 
medical, dental, and building projects for areas that no longer tolerate 
the actions of JI, ASG, and other unlawful groups. The products were 
careful not to single out individuals, but focused on the improvements 
made to the communities that no longer provided overt or tacit support 
to ASG or JI elements.  
The PSYOP civil-military LOE began to generate momentum 
in conjunction with SF and NSW synchronized civil-military 
engagements within local communities. Civil-military events provided 
access to free basic and advanced medical, dental, and veterinary care. 
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Under the insurgents’ coercive influences, These services were rarely 
available to remote communities  throughout Sulu, Basilan, and into the 
Muslim areas of Mindanao. Each event was actively promoted and 
designed as a community-wide event by AFP and JSOTF-P personnel 
and supported by local community leaders. The PSYOP detachment’s 
forward support teams mingled with the crowds and ran engagement 
events in the local language to build or improve the social-operational 
picture. This method of engagement proved invaluable in developing 
follow-on messages and products that captured the positive 
achievements of the events. More importantly, they created 
interpersonal messages and increased access to a growing social-group 
network. With each favorably affected community, a new conduit 
opened up for passing on and spreading future information throughout 
the provinces. 
The PSYOP Disrupt LOE created dissent between population 
areas typically used by the insurgents and the threat groups by 
challenging the abilities of the insurgent groups’ main leadership. For 
this effort, a series of PSYOP messaging, products, and actions focused 
on amplifying the negative attributes, actions, and distress caused by 
the ASG and JI groups operating within communities and across the 
affected areas of Mindanao. Not only did this include communities 
targeted for ASG attacks, but it also included those communities 
affected by the second- and third-order of effects of insurgent attacks 
and extortion activities. It further included as an audience the families 
of ASG members, who were not receiving the aid and benefits of the 
communities open to AFP and U.S. assistance.  
Although the influence approach was tailored for each 
community, the end objective was to create a divisive attitude between 
the ASG and its support base in the population. Each attack or 
attempted attack was captured through imagery and messages to the 
populace, marking JI and ASG as the culprits within minutes to hours 
of an event. By seizing the information initiative, the AFP and JSOTF-
P maintained and increased the influence momentum. Similarly, when a 
medical, dental, veterinary, or engineering civic action program was 
held, disrupt messages coupled with civil-military engagement 
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influence messaging shaped the local environment by publicizing the 
positive event and inviting local and surrounding communities, 
specifically, those communities that were known for tacit and active 
support for the ASG. This served to further enhance the positive effects 
of the AFP/JSOTF-P presence versus the increasingly negative impacts 
the ASG was having across the area of operations. Significantly, the 
PSYOP disruption messages and products  amplified internal ASG/JI 
dissent, which began to surface through sources. Our PSYOP 
messaging mediums capitalized upon these seams by amplifying the 
population’s silent-majority concerns and grievances with the ASG.
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ASG-associated communities and those affected by terrorist attacks 
began to realize they were not isolated in their struggle, and that there 
was an alternative to living with JI/ASG/MILF exploitation. 
Examples of the SF and PSYOP combined capability took 
place when attacks occurred against community centers of gravity like 
marketplaces, malls, or bus stations. The PSYOP and SF operators 
made every effort to provide aid and security and to capture images of 
the devastation.  To further alienate the insurgent groups, the PSYOP 
detachment researched the victims and, with their consent, tailored a 
series of influence products highlighting the atrocity, the losses, and the 
terrorist leader responsible. Information was gathered through local 
sources, AFP and U.S. forces, or through our PSYOP ethnographic 
research and media resources. The PSYOP detachment injected the 
information into the media campaign, along with more community-
centric messages and products, to create a local and regional layered 
influence effect against the ASG and JI elements responsible for 
ordering and executing the attacks. With the civil-military and 
dissention aspects of the disrupt effort building upon each other, the 
Rewards LOE further tied the PSYOP portion of the influence 
campaign together by presenting various incentives for information that 
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would lead to the capture and arrest of multiple terrorist leaders, 
severely hindering terrorist activities. 
The PSYOP Rewards LOE originated from supporting the U.S. 
country team’s effort to establish a Rewards for Justice Program in the 
Philippines.
48
 After several months of establishing and linking the 
PSYOP influence LOEs into the wider JSOTF-P influence campaign, 
the rewards program was adapted into a format that negatively 
personalized the most-wanted terrorists by accurately and rapidly 
affiliating specific ASG-JI terrorists with their associated attacks, as 
well as with the affected and neighboring communities. To overcome 
ASG’s familial ties with their affiliated communities, PSYOP messages 
personalized the attacks by publicizing the effects on the victims and 
their extended families. The empathy and sense of loss began to 
resonate within the ASG’s own support base.
49
 Imagery of the damage 
was associated with imagery of the terrorists responsible for ordering or 
executing the attacks. 
The PSYOP detachment paid careful attention not to show 
carnage but to encapsulate the fear and anguish of the witnesses, as 
well as the grim determination of the AFP and U.S. forces that were 
often the first to arrive on the scene with medical aid and security. By 
directly linking attacks with terrorist leaders identified in the Rewards 
products and the emotional and physical effects on the victims, we 
slowly began to break through familial and clan loyalty. With each 
success the AFP and JSOTF-P increased the number of information tips 
received, often enabling key intelligence developments for future 
operations. The terrorists quickly lost the influence initiative while the 
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AFP and JSOTF-P steadily increased their positive momentum and 
built upon each gain. 
One particularly successful approach for eroding the terrorists’ 
influence with traditional familial and clan loyalties was through a 
mass media campaign as a separate LOE. What began as a small two- 
to three-month effort quickly expanded into a yearlong influence 
campaign that used TV, radio, and print media disseminated to specific 
audiences throughout the JSOTF-P AOR. This was possible only 
through the coordinated support of the U.S. country team, AFP senior 
leadership, and the most popular media outlets in the Philippines. Using 
marketing and ethnographic research, each broadcast, newspaper 
advertisement, dialect, and theme was managed on a daily basis in 
response to events unfolding on the ground. During a major AFP 
offensive, several variations of “wanted” and “victim” commercials 
were aired to disrupt ASG and JI movement away from traditional safe 
havens and evasion routes. 
In this case, the victims’ stories were pivotal influence 
messages that galvanized empathy with audiences. The campaign 
provided an uninterruptable voice for the victims’ stories and selected 
private pictures to make each terrorist attack personally resonate with 
the target audiences.
50
 Specific attention was given to sharing the 
stories of affected Filipino Muslim families and children. The media 
campaign reinforced and complemented more localized PSYOP 
products, creating a massing influence effect against the insurgent 
groups and their leadership. The media products were disseminated into 
areas known for active, tacit, and coerced support to the terrorist or 
insurgent groups responsible for attacks throughout the JSOTF-P AOR. 
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After 12 months of incremental successes, in 2007 the PSYOP 
detachment expanded the media LOE by developing a text-messaging 
social-media platform to further broaden the scope and reach of our 
Influence Operations. The effort was purposely kept attributable as a 
reliable means for the population to report JI, ASG, and other insurgent 
activity, but also as a reliable information and news conduit for 
communities that voluntarily opted in to the program. The program 
began by working with a major Philippine telecommunications 
provider with established service in remote areas. 
To comply with Philippine law, AFP and JSOTF-P outreach-
event attendees were asked to sign up as members of the information 
news service. This enabled them to receive news and community 
information, including free minutes, or a set amount of prepaid minutes 
for their current cellular account to offset the cost of receiving text 
messages.
51
 The “subscribers” in turn agreed to receive periodic news 
and messages from our information service. After establishing the 
service as a credible, reliable, and responsive information service, the 
PSYOP text messaging number was incorporated into community 
Disruption and Rewards products and messages to expand the reporting 
options on local JI, ASG, and other lawless group activities. Over a 
period of time, subscribers, and even ASG members, began conversing 
with PSYOP team members managing the text messaging service. The 
information was shared with our AFP counterparts and passed on to 
appropriate leadership for action. Within a matter of weeks, 
information regarding the location and planned action of ASG bands on 
Sulu began to flow into the service.
52
 The text-messaging concept was 
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 Unfortunately, the text service proved short-lived. Shortly after our 
respective redeployments from JSOTF-P, the text-messaging service was 
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developed based our combined SF-PSYOP initiatives the year before, 
supporting an AFP Marine request to improve their influence and 
operating environment in and around the city of Marawi.  
Achieving these effects was in no small part due to a fusion 
with the JSOTF-P intelligence operations. It is essential to include the 
intelligence effort within the influence fusion cell in order to 
successfully shape and mutually support the intelligence support 
operations LOE. This process develops into a reciprocal mechanism for 
effectively influencing the information and operational environments 
over the long term. Embracing COL Linder’s Influence Operations 
intent, we would later learn that our actions supporting the AFP 
Marines in Marawi became the catalyst that started our SF-PSYOP 
fused influence concept. 
 
E. Intelligence Support Operations 
Intelligence support operations designed to track and interdict 
terrorist leadership and networks became increasingly successful due to 
the increasingly improved AFP-JSOTF-P influence campaign. The 
AFP’s capacity to conduct effective tactical operations, civil-military 
engagement, psychological operations, and intelligence gathering has 
increased exponentially over the past decade.
53
 The U.S. supports the 
Philippine government and security forces with access to information, 
intelligence, and modern technology to assist their efforts to build and 




                                                                                                                         
discontinued rather than expanded and resourced as a continued information 
and influence conduit. 
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 The AFP does not employ a U.S.-defined IO intermediary staff. Their public 
affairs and PSYOP forces operate in a combined or fused construct with their 
civil affairs teams to maximize the productivity of their influence 
methodology. The AFP employs their strategic communications force as a 
national asset with a sensitive operational purview. 
54
 Personal communcations with MAJ Matthew Worsham, USMC, JSOTF-P 
intelligence officer 2008-2009, September 2010 to February 2011. 
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JSOTF-P embedded liaison coordination elements with AFP 
units (at their request) conducted subject matter expertise exchanges 
with AFP units throughout the country and leveraged U.S. country 
team support and programs to improve interoperability. AFP leadership 
and staff were also invited and encouraged to regularly participate in 
the daily activities of the joint operations center. Despite limited 
intelligence-sharing agreements, AFP and U.S. intelligence 
professionals worked closely to find solutions while protecting the 
sensitive interests of their respective countries. This reflected the 
realistic obstacles of balancing the needs for intelligence sharing and 
protecting sensitive capabilities and methods without sacrificing regular 
engagement between U.S forces and our host nation partners.  
Key to JSOTF-P’s Intelligence LOO success was the ability of 
U.S. intelligence personnel to “export” the processing, exploitation, and 
dissemination of the collected intelligence to the partner or host in 
order to build their capacity and give them ownership of the decision-
making cycle. This step cannot be overemphasized. The U.S. will 
almost assuredly gravitate toward its strengths (powerful technology 
and resources that are out of reach for most developing countries), 
while assuredly falling short in fully leveraging the cultural nuances 
associated with understanding the enemy. The needs of the local 
population, the limitations of the host’s or partner’s intelligence 
capacity, and the sheer manpower required to fully analyze the deluge 
of information collected requires a combined partnership.
55
 The 
application of intelligence is situational and sometimes commander-
dependent, but the goal remains the same: maximizing support to 
operations while simultaneously increasing the host nation’s self-
reliance and capacity to operate autonomously. The desired effect for 
terror groups is dissent within their ranks, discord from the populace, 
and their surrender, dissolution, and demonstrated defeat. 
  





III. Influence Operations in Action 
 
Cohesive AFP and JSOTF-P influence operations began with 
the arrival of JSOTF-P’s new commander, COL James Linder. What he 
began by rapidly adapting the mission into an overall Influence 
Operation to shape the environment and enable decisive AFP 
offensives against the insurgent terror groups would continue with 
subsequent JSOTF-P commanders. The subsequent arrival of COL 
William Coultrup would elevate these operations to new heights.  
As JSOTF-P began changing its operational design, the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines were charged with three missions: (1) get 
control of the instability created by southern Philippines secessionist 
groups, (2) address the issues in accordance with the rule of law, and 
(3) reinforce the legitimacy of the government of the Philippines. In 
order to support the AFP in restricting the movement of the three key 
armed groups—the ASG, JI, and “rogue” MILF elements—COL 
Linder quickly decided that the headquarters of JSOTF-P needed to 
relocate south from Manila to the operational theater in Zamboanga. 
The relocation to Zamboanga was particularly important because of the 
limited number of U.S. forces assigned to the task force, which 
required immersive exposure to local culture and the environment. As it 
stood, U.S. SOF was not operating as a contiguous effort and was 
divided across the JSOTF-P AOR. With the exception of one 
Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA),
56
 all U.S. Special Operations 
Forces were relocated to Zamboanga with the tactical detachments 
moving to reinforce Jolo, Tawi-Tawi, and eventually Basilan in an 
economy-of-force effort to deny the enemy traditional safe haven 
access.  
The following two operational cases demonstrate how 
Influence Operations supported the goals of the host nation and the 
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joint Special Operations task force. In the first case of the Islamic city 
of Marawi, the Mindanao-based ODA was assigned the key supporting-
effort mission to maintain the operational picture of all of Central 
Mindanao and prevent it from growing into a cauldron of ASG/MILF 
influence against the U.S. and the Republic of the Philippines. In the 
second case, Influence Operations were used to shape the environment 
and close off escape routes while the AFP Marines and JSOTF-P began 
to deny Jolo as an ASG-JI safe haven. Each case provides different 
lessons on successful Influence Operations methods in semi-permissive 
and non-permissive environments. A significant contributing factor in 
each case was the JSOTF-P commander’s overarching guidance to 
build positive relationships with the AFP and Philippine government, to 
assist the U.S. mission with improving the security situation, to find 
and fix the ASG and JI through Influence Operations for AFP tactical 
operations, and to apply our SOF mindset and resources towards 




A. Together in the Islamic City of Marawi  
In central Mindanao, the city of Marawi is a microcosm of 
Arab influence. Marawi is the only “Islamic city” in the Philippines and 
is comprised of almost 200,000 Filipinos from various tribal and ethnic 
backgrounds, concentrated into a 35-square-mile area. The level and 
integration of Wahhabi and traditional Arab Muslim characteristics by 
the people of Marawi is in stark contrast the rest of the Philippines 
Muslim communities. Arabic signs, posters, and script replace nearly 
all Filipino local and national language public information conveyance 
methods throughout the city. The Saudi Fund for Development, an 
organization that is comparable to USAID, is one of many Arab 
funding sources that maintain active initiatives in Marawi. These 
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funding activities foster and maintain varying degrees of influence over 
the city’s Muslim religious and community leaders.  
Marawi was important to our operations because it bound us 
together as a team of Special Forces, PSYOP, and AFP Marines in a 
fused and combined effort to break into a non-permissive influence 
environment. Our operations in Marawi presented particular challenges. 
Each village, community, province, and hostile group was unique 
within the concept of population-centric warfare, but they all shared 
cultural and personal commonalities. For example, outrage over the 
arbitrary killing of children by bus bombs, the need for medical 
assistance for all children in Mindanao, and the general desire for a safe 
and secure environment were bridges across all groups, religions, and 
clan perceptions of self-identity. However, there were no friendly 
intelligence assets trained or allocated to produce this information in 
and around Marawi. We were able to identify these pressure points 
through the evolution of our operations, by being the SOF operators on 
the ground mired in the mud with the AFP Marines who lived within 
the communities. Through these efforts, we enabled the Marines to 
apply appropriate action and reaction using our combined specialties 
and our understanding of how to use information and actions to shape 
the operating environment. 
One of the most important relationships the SF ODA 
established in Marawi was with the local Philippine Marine brigade. 
The brigade wanted an ODA to live and operate with them to get in 
touch with the people throughout Marawi and the surrounding rural 
populations. Creating a positive relationship between the population 
and the local Marines did not come overnight, but it did grow due to 
persistent initiatives that proved to be the founding element to success 
in Marawi. 
Prior to our work with the this Marine brigade, their interaction 
with the people of Marawi was limited because of the perception that 
the Philippine Marines were aggressors sent by the GRP as occupiers. 
A few staunch anti-GRP community leaders who were supported by 
foreign entities incited friction. As a result, the Marines limited 
themselves to the physical terrain they owned, such as the small ridge 
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line that bisects the city. The Philippine Marines were slowly building 
trust through limited conflict resolution initiatives among the 
community, but they did not have the resources to mitigate JI-, rogue 
MILF-, and other foreign actor-sponsored malicious influence efforts 
against the Marines and the Philippine government within Marawi.  
The local Philippine Marines brigade commander wanted to 
build off of their initial successes as mediators and a trusted security 
force for local conflicts. The Marines understood they were in a 
position to become a trusted, unbiased force in ending and preventing 
long-standing familial blood fueds called ridos, but they needed 
support in building and sustaining an influence advantage. One of the 
Marines’ first initiatives was to establish their own tip line for 
anonymous callers to help identify crime, terrorism, and corruption 
without risk of reprisal. Before building an influence edge that the 
Marines could maintain and continue to grow, we began training senior 
Marine leadership on the nuances of information narratives and civil-
military engagement. The Philippine Marines began to learn and 
embrace the purpose of education programs on proper sanitation 
practices, targeted MEDCAPs, targeted engineering projects, and 
identifying key community nodes (formal and informal) to establish 
trusting relationships for use as information conduits. This process was 
instrumental in properly targeting semi-permissive communities that 
would support friendly/permissive communities while at the same time 
serving as a mechanism to open up non-permissive, or hostile, 
communities to further build trust.  
After weeks of extensive conversations with our AFP 
counterparts and limited local community leaders, we began to 
understand the depth of malicious and non-malicious influence from JI 
and other foreign Muslim actors in Central Mindanao that seemed to 
propagate out of Marawi. As our engagements and relationships grew 
with our AFP counterparts, we increasingly learned of JI leadership and 
training cells that were seeking and establishing refuge and operational 
ties to smaller Islamist groups and rogue MILF elements throughout the 
city and its surrounding highlands.  
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Learning the cultural idiosyncrasies between different tribes 
and clans despite similar political affiliations only came by living and 
embedding with our AFP counterparts. For example, although the 
Maranaoans and Maguindanaoans coexisted in the ARMM and 
generally spoke with a unified pro-ARMM voice, there were 
underlying ridos that outsiders – such as the Philippine Marines and 
their American SOF advisors – would regularly encounter and address 
before engagement initiatives spanning multiple clans and subcultures. 
Unassuming bits of social intelligence were increasingly interwoven 
into the larger picture; learning Khadaffy Janjalani
58
 attended 
Mindanao State University, for instance, was significant. This 
seemingly small piece of information began to highlight ASG’s wider 
ideological recruiting and support base, and helped us discover how to 
disrupt and deny that support. As our understanding of Marawi 
improved, we were able to help focus the Philippine Marines efforts to 
expand the personal and professional choices available to the people by 
augmenting the Marines’ efforts to demonstrate alternatives to illicit 
activities and income. This tangentially improved the local population’s 
relationship with the Philippine Government, as the Marines were 
increasingly recognized as public servants and not aggressors.  
In addition to understanding local social dynamics through 
persistent presence and engagement with the AFP Marines, the SF and 
PYSOP teams put direct pressure on the people who were actively or 
tacitly supporting ASG and JI activities. The approach was simple but 
extremely effective. First, the SF team took photos of a broad set of the 
Arabic writings and posters throughout the city. The PYSOP team then 
identified the Arabic dialect and any malicious information, and 
translated existing PSYOP messages and products into the same Arabic 
dialect to establish a competing counter-effort. The newly translated 
“Wanted” posters and leaflets directly communicated to the target 
audience that Marawi would no longer be a permissive environment for 
extremist ideologies. One of the key factors in the success of this 
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program was having the SF and PSYOP teams in close proximity to the 
operating area and to each other. This allowed the effort to be nuanced, 
precise, and timely. After several months of working with the 1st 
Marine Brigade, the Philippine Marines adopted the influence practices 
as their own and continued to build upon each success.  
As the ODA mentored the Philippine Marines and engaged 
with the population, the PSYOP team customized influence messages 
and products to support the influence effort. PSYOP print products 
depicted the Marines’ support to the community. Each PSYOP product 
was tailored so local populations would recognize their own neighbors 
and the Marines assigned to those areas. Over an eight-month period, 
the Marines gained positive influence as friends and supporters, rather 
than still being seen as an outside threat to the local community. At 
their request, PSYOP posters and handouts included phone numbers of 
local Marine leaders to contact for help. This brought the Marines 
closer to the community as trusted and fair arbiters of local disputes.
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The SF ODA and the Philippine Marines’ Influence Operations in 
Marawi benefited from a very responsive PSYOP approval process 
with the JSOTF-P commander and the U.S. country team. Due to 
strong professional relationships between the ODA, the PSYOP 
commander, the JSOTF-P commander, and the country team -- not to 
mention the trust earned over weeks and months of operations -- we 
were empowered to invest sufficient time and resources toward 
supporting the 1st Marine Brigade and capacity-building initiatives.  
As operations progressed in Marawi, two key principles 
emerged in achieving and sustaining success that became mutually 
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reinforcing and provided a testing ground for how Influence Operations 
can be applied.
60
 The first is a core SOF principle:  
 Build trust and legitimacy with the host nation forces.  
This requires patience, respect, and a continued presence 
living, eating, and operating with your counterparts for prolonged 
periods. There is simply no substitution for building and maintaining 
core relationships.  
These relationships enable the second principle:  
 Successful Influence Operations are sustained by 
supporting messages with deeds/actions and synchronizing 
them with those your counterparts are exercising.  
It is essential to ensure that host-nation partners understand the 
purpose, plan of action, and systematic process of conducting Influence 
Operations. Every word and deed has an effect, and every mistake has 
the potential for a magnitude of adverse effects and loss of the 
influence initiative. In Marawi and its surrounding communities, the 
sustained and synchronized AFP and/or U.S. presence on the ground in 
each village and community was vital to developing intelligence 
networks and recognizing the cultural and linguistic nuances that allow 
an Influence Operation to grow within the target audiences. Details 
matter—whether a local dialect or a matter of timing. Targeted 
influence narratives and acts are most effective and credible when 
friendly forces are persistently present and adeptly aware of the unique 
characteristics within each community.  
Although it was not systematically planned or considered when 
we developed personal and professional relationships with our 
Philippine Army counterparts, our combined efforts began to mitigate 
the operational seams and gaps in our area of operations as we traveled 
throughout the countryside. For instance, JI was using political and 
geographic boundaries to position their safe havens between three 
separate and unaligned AFP division areas of responsibility. This was 
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mitigated by the ODA closing the information gaps between the 
divisions with respect to the ASG-JI threat. At the same time, the 
dissemination of PSYOP messages and products built on ASG and JI 
perceptions that the ODA and AFP units were actively pursuing ASG-
JI cells, reinforcing their fear of settling into a safe haven. The 
methodology that we intuitively developed can best be described in 
military terms as influence bounding overwatch, or influence bounding. 
This is similar to the U.S. Infantry’s concept of bounding overwatch, in 
which squads or platoons alternate positions to cover for each other as 
they move forward. The SF and PSYOP techniques used in Marawi 
became the catalyst that fused our elements into a cohesive, 
interdependent SOF team executing comprehensive Influence 
Operations at the operational and tactical levels. This technique 
organized and synchronized efforts to affect multiple targets and 
audiences across seemingly disparate social groups and geographies. 
Our Special Forces and PSYOP actions rotated the main effort role 
based on what the situation required for each village, community, and 
area we encountered. The message-deed, deed-message roles between 
our respective capabilities became intertwined in a unity of effort to 
favorably influence each community in support of the larger JSOTF-P 
mission. 
Moreover, as the Philippine Marines and JSOTF-P became 
more involved in Marawi and the surrounding areas over the next few 
months, NGOs and organizations like USAID began to increasingly 
invest in the population to ensure that malicious influence against the 
people and GRP did not regain the influence initiative. For example, 
USAID brought in sewing machines and education programs to teach 
the women in Marawi a skill set that enabled them to become income 
earners for their families. This was an unprecedented change to the 
dynamics of the community and served as an income alternative to 
illicit activities.  
The Marines’ influence efforts were reinforced when the 
JSOTF-P commander authorized a portion of the USS Blue Ridge’s 
MEDCAP to support the ODA and AFP in Central Mindanao. The USS 
Blue Ridge’s support began with the introduction of what we called 
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“doctors without helicopter doors.” In close coordination with JSOTF-
P and the USS Blue Ridge, medical personal provided a physical 
demonstration of the investment by the Philippine Marines, the GRP, 
and the United States in the people of Marawi and the surrounding 
areas. The doctors, primarily Filipino with a small contingent of U.S. 
physicians, were clearly visible in their traditional white coats as they 
circled the city several times in the USS Blue Ridge’s helicopters 
before landing and beginning the first of a series of MEDCAPs 
dedicated to the area. This left a lasting impression on the population 
and cemented the PSYOP messages that the AFP and U.S. personnel 
were present to support the people against violent extremist groups—
not to police the people or kill them, as suggested by the enemy’s 
word-of-mouth propaganda campaign. The tipping point against the 
enemy’s influence effort was apparent with the turnout for the 
MEDCAP. Despite the hostile attitudes of the Islamist male population, 
their wives and children attended the MEDCAP in unexpected 
numbers. When MEDCAP concluded, the women repeatedly thanked 
the doctors, Marines, and U.S. personnel for their support and help. 
With tears in their eyes, the women repeatedly asked if the AFP and 
U.S. would stay longer and not forget them.   
What started as a modest request initiated by the local 
Philippine Marines’ commander led to a combined AFP Marines-
JSOTF-P Influence Operation using techniques that became integrated 
into the Marine Brigade’s planning and operations as a matter of 
routine. JSOTF-P subsequently dedicated a full Special Operations task 
force, with embedded PSYOP and civil affairs teams, to support the 
AFP efforts throughout Mindanao to sustain the Influence Operations 
initiated by our earlier engagements with the local Marine brigade. 
USAID also fulfilled its commitment to the area with additional trade 
skill transition programs, new farm-to-market road construction, 
computer education programs, and support to expanded NGO activities 
in the region. As a result, the Philippine Marines’ effort became a 
conduit for the GRP-U.S. anti-terrorism effort, feeding into the wider 
intelligence community. This increased the collective GRP-U.S. ability 
to develop better target sets for collection, more accurate 
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characterization of threats, counter violent extremist influence 
endeavors, and assess malicious foreign activities throughout the 
Southern Philippines. 
 
B. Sulu: Message, Messenger, and Medium
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In October 2005, JSOTF-P and the AFP set about gaining safe 
access to the island of Jolo through civil-military initiatives.
62
 Civil-
military engagement grew rapidly over a period of six months and 
resulted in the development of dozens of civil infrastructure projects, 
free medical clinics, and free veterinary clinics for the people of Jolo.
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Initially, the projects were provided to the least hostile communities 
along the periphery of the island’s capital city.  
In contrast to the Islamic city of Marawi and the MILF-
controlled areas in Central Mindanao, Influence Operations on Sulu 
spanned a smaller geographic area with equally complex political and 
social group dynamics. The Sulu AOR also encapsulated the maritime 
environment and a maritime population of increasing operational 
importance. For instance, the Bajau people (locally referred to as the 
sea gypsies) possessed an unparalleled understanding of everything that 
moved throughout the Sulu Archipelago. The vast majority of the 
population on Sulu was openly hostile to the AFP. Conditions between 
the AFP and Tausug population remained volatile due to a history of 
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friction and sometimes open conflict between local Tausug militias and 
the AFP on Sulu. AFP relations were particularly poor with the Tausug 
MNLF faction that controlled most of the eastern half of Sulu.
64
 AFP 
and JSOTF-P Influence Operations helped to shape the environment, 
rebuild trust between the AFP and Sulu’s array of communities, and 
successfully disrupt ASG activities. Similar to Marawi, AFP forces and 
JSOTF-P SOF elements increasingly gained access to previously 
unreceptive communities using the Influence Operations methodology. 
These engagements provided a wealth of influence “do’s and don’ts” 
by identifying unique local community and Tausug cultural 
sensitivities. The culmination of this information allowed AFP and 
JSOTF-P teams to quickly capitalize on ASG mistakes, and ultimately 
undermine the hostile support systems.  
One of the first and most important challenges on Sulu was 
helping to restore the credibility of the AFP forces. With the 
cooperation of local community leaders, the combined efforts of 
JSOTF-P’s maneuver elements (Army Special Forces, Naval Special 
Warfare, PSYOP and Civil Affairs personnel, and their AFP 
counterparts) began a systematic effort to rebuild relations with the 
local population. These efforts eased residual tensions still simmering 
from hostilities in 2004 and 2005, when the AFP attempted unilateral 
conventional operations against the insurgents. The previous operations 
severely alienated the population to the point where many locals joined 
civil militias to actively resist AFP efforts. The U.S.-first approach was 
used only until the AFP’s trust among the locals was re-established, 
allowing a reversal of the AFP-U.S. roles.  
Initial operations on Sulu focused on building AFP tactical 
combat capacity, with PSYOP and civil affairs actions serving in more 
decentralized and supporting roles. This changed with JSOTF-P’s new 
shift to Sulu. Influence Operations became the principle LOO, with a 
primary emphasis on the message, messengers, and media, all of which 
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were tailored to specific audiences. AFP and JSOTF-P Influence 
Operations were setting the stage for more precise AFP combat actions. 
Coupled with civil-military engagements synchronized by Special 
Forces teams on the ground, AFP and JSOTF-P PSYOP forces 
amplified the reach of key communicators supportive of the AFP and 
U.S. presence. The AFP, accompanied by U.S. Special Forces and 
PSYOP teams, disseminated messages through an array of local and 
wide-area messaging techniques and actions in an effort to affect the 
behavior and attitudes of the local population, disrupt the insurgents, 
and build local community support. JSOTF-P’s maneuver elements 
worked with the AFP to interpersonally engage with local villages and 
communities. Simultaneously, the influence narratives on the ground 
were reinforced by the PSYOP detachment using broader-reaching 
media (such as radio, television, and text messaging) to create a 
massing effect of influence messages and actions/deeds throughout the 
JSOTF-P AOR.  
AFP and JSOTF-P forces engaged each community, from 
permissive to non-permissive, in a village-hopping type of campaign 
with great effect. Each of JSOTF-P’s core SOF capabilities  alternated 
main effort roles based on the needs of the operation to ultimately 
influence non-permissive communities to become semi permissive, and 
semi-permissive to become permissive to AFP access and anti-ASG 
objectives. The general population’s attitude and perception began to 
positively shift from a hostile anti-AFP disposition to one that would 
support future AFP military operation against the ASG on Sulu. One by 
one, semi-hostile (and eventually hostile) villages began to change their 
opinions of the U.S. and the AFP. After a period of six months, a 180-
degree change in local attitudes and behavior was underway based on 
feedback from JSOTF-P’s maneuver elements on the ground.
65
 Villages 
known to support the ASG due to family or other ties began requesting 
similar civil-military medical and engineering activities that were 
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occurring on the periphery of their communities. Villages and 
municipalities within the AFP and JSOTF-P focus areas of operation 
began to shift their disposition from guarded and negative to a 
generally positive attitude toward U.S. forces and hesitantly accepting 
of the AFP’s engagement efforts.  
In August 2006 an ASG commander ordered an IED attack on 
the local Jolo City co-op, which was refusing to give into ASG 
extortion efforts. That attack became a catalyst in improving AFP 
relations with local residents and undercutting ASG support on the 
island. The attack on the Jolo co-op killed or wounded 12 people, all of 
whom were Philippine Muslims. Within minutes of the attack, AFP and 
U.S. forces were on the scene providing medical aid and security, and 
stabilizing the situation. The JSOTF-P PSYOP detachment rapidly 
developed products following the attack to amplify and spread local 
criticism of the ASG and share images of AFP Marines and U.S. forces 
running to aid the bombing victims. Additional PSYOP messages and 
products countered enemy propaganda blaming the AFP for the 
bombing, and demonized the ASG actions and their JI “puppeteers” as 
cowardly and self-serving. As a result, a potentially negative 
psychological action (PSYACT)
66
 against the AFP turned into a 
successful “influence counter-ambush” against the insurgents. 
Instrumental to this success was the unified AFP-U.S. relationship and 
response to the attack.
67
 AFP senior leaders, the U.S. country team, and 
the JSOTF-P commander credited the AFP-JSOTF-P response to the 
bombing with helping to solidify changes in local attitudes and 
behavior against the ASG. As local key communicators began to call 
on their supporters to stop or resist supporting the insurgents, more and 
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more village and religious leaders began to openly speak out against the 
ASG and their JI associates.
68
  
Following the Jolo co-op bombing, AFP and JSOTF-P 
Influence Operations increased in volume and momentum. AFP and 
U.S medical personnel visited an increasing number of villages and 
communities to conduct medical, dental, and veterinary civil action 
programs. Engineering civil action programs also renovated local 
school buildings, dug fresh-water wells into semi-permissive 
communities, and improved roads into semi- and non-permissive 
communities to improve access. These efforts served to further alienate 
hostile groups throughout the island and enabled rapid movement of 
AFP and JSOTF-P forces to respond to calls for aid from local villages 
resisting the ASG. As AFP and U.S. medical personnel visited an 
increasing number of local villages to conduct MEDCAPs, the clans 
and families associated with ASG leadership and front-line fighters 
began to try and slow the effects. During one particular MEDCAP, a 
neighboring ASG faction was preparing an IED attack against AFP and 
U.S. forces who were conducting the MEDCAP.
69
 When the local ASG 
commander whose family resided near the village heard of the planned 
attack, he immediately cancelled it. As reported by our AFP 
counterparts and community leaders, the ASG commander’s family and 
his soldiers’ families were participating in the MEDCAP and wanted 
no hostile interference with it. The local commander was reportedly 
concerned about the safety of his family, and that an attack would 
prevent future medical assistance visits.
70
 The trend of behavior and the 
positive measures of effectiveness toward the civil-military initiatives 
continued to grow.  
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Several weeks after the Jolo co-op bombing, preparations for a 
major AFP operation against ASG safe havens on Sulu began to 
coalesce. AFP and U.S. PSYOP, civil affairs, and SF teams began a 
new phase of Influence Operations, solidifying the populations’ 
positive disposition toward the AFP and U.S. A persistent challenge in 
engaging the ASG on Sulu was countering their ability to find 
sanctuary in the jungle and among sympathetic villages. The ASG and 
JI maintained logistical support architecture in Central Mindanao, and 
they were historically adept at using their maritime connections to 
escape by sea to and from Central Mindanao. While AFP and JSOTF-P 
forces began to set conditions on Sulu for the pending AFP Marines 
offensive, JSOTF-P began preparing adjacent operating areas to affect 
the ASG’s ability to withdraw or call upon their habitual local support. 
JSOTF-P’s Central Mindanao ODA and the strategic PSYOP team 
initiated an operation to further disrupt ASG and JI forces from leaving 
Sulu during the pending AFP Marine offensive.  
This effort began with increased dissemination of the “Rewards 
for Justice” messages and products through multiple dissemination 
mediums.
71
 The messages factually attributed past ASG-and JI-
orchestrated atrocities against Muslim Filipinos, called out extortion 
tactics, and sought local support in turning over ASG and JI leadership. 
Additionally, the PSYOP detachment surged disruption messaging 
using informal social networks, key communicator engagements, text 
messaging, print, and other activities to prevent the ASG from fleeing 
Sulu. The PSYOP wide-area multimedia campaign also reallocated TV 
and radio broadcasts into and around Sulu and across Central Mindanao 
in areas known to harbor JI and ASG. The multimedia surge further 
criminalized ASG and JI leaders by recounting past events into mini-
thematic commercials that told the stories through the eyes of witnesses 
and victims. The campaign balanced the hard-hitting anti-ASG and 
rewards messages with “Mindanao Peace” themes supporting the 
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On Sulu, JSOTF-P maneuver elements and their AFP 
counterparts continued Influence Operations throughout the periphery 
of the AFP engagement areas to disrupt ASG’s and JI’s withdrawal 
routes to safe havens deeper inside the jungle. Simultaneously, the SF 
ODA in Central Mindanao and JSOTF-P’s strategic PSYOP team 
began a disruption effort against the ASG and their supporters to create 
the belief that the AFP and U.S. were positioned to capture ASG- JI 
leadership if they tried to flee Sulu to their previous Mindanao safe 
havens. Together, our SF and PSYOP teams and AFP counterparts in 
Central Mindanao initiated an influence campaign in and around 
previous ASG safe havens and sympathizer enclaves to demonstrate an 
increased and active AFP-U.S. presence. This effort was synchronized 
with increased PSYOP rewards and media campaign message 
dissemination. Similarly, AFP and U.S. Naval Special Warfare 
elements further reinforced the influence effort to disrupt ASG-JI 
escape plans by cordoning off select maritime areas between Sulu and 
traditional transit routes into Central Mindanao.
73
  
By increasing uncharacteristic AFP and U.S. military activity 
in Central Mindanao, querying local key communicators and sources 
for information by AFP and SF ODA elements, and increasing PSYOP 
dissemination of TV, radio, and face-to-face influence messages, the 
joint and combined efforts of Special Forces and PSYOP made ASG 
and JI relocation plans to Mindanao seem untenable. Intelligence later 
reported that ASG and JI leadership were informed by their own people 
not to flee to Central Mindanao because the AFP and U.S. were 
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expecting them. In the end, ASG senior leaders did not attempt to flee 
to neighboring islands or Central Mindanao for fear of being captured.  
With the conclusion of the AFP’s offensive, the ASG remained 
pressured and increasingly isolated as AFP and U.S. forces rapidly 
expanded Influence Operations into the former ASG-dominated areas 
on Sulu. During AFP combat operations on Sulu, villages that actively 
resisted the AFP just 12 months earlier either stayed out of the fight or 
actively provided information for the AFP’s assault against ASG 
enclaves. Villages outside the combat area refused to support the ASG, 
reported ASG movement, and resisted calls from the ASG and their 
local allies to actively fight the AFP. This served to further disrupt 
ASG withdrawal routes and was a 180-degree change in local attitudes 
since the AFP’s prior offensive actions on Sulu in 2004 and 2005. 
Within days of the assault on ASG camps in Sulu, the AFP overran 
several ASG strongholds, forcing them deeper into Sulu’s mountainous 
jungle interior and further away from their deteriorating support from 
the population.  
Similarly, as a result of the disruption messaging and increased 
AFP pressure in Central Mindanao, the foreign JI cells became isolated 
within Central Mindanao’s Butig Mountains. The multi-faceted 
approach to setting conditions for selective operations against the ASG 
on Sulu through comprehensive Influence Operations paid off. These 
efforts would be duplicated over the next four years to address other 
insurgent activities in Eastern Sulu, Basilan, and again in Central 
Mindanao. The synchronized and deliberate approach to message, 
messenger, and medium applied by the AFP and JSOTF-P increasingly 
improved their access and acceptance as operations expanded to other 
islands and provinces. Word spread quickly about the positive changes 
on Sulu into neighboring regions, with AFP and JSOTF-P civil-military 
support increasingly requested and welcomed into communities that 
previously resisted AFP access. 
 
C. After Sulu: Shoring Up Basilan and Zamboanga  
Nearly a year after the Sulu offensive, different and more 
aggressive examples of successful Influence Operations took place on 
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the Island of Basilan and in the provincial capital of Zamboanga. In 
2007, brothers Omar Sailani and Iting Sailani, two notorious mid-level 
ASG leaders, responded to AFP successes by planning a coordinated 
IED attack against an AFP regional headquarters that also housed many 
JSOTF-P personnel. As reports of the brothers’ plans and whereabouts 
in the area began to accumulate, the stage was set for Influence 
Operations to play a pivotal role in disrupting and deterring their ability 
to operate from traditional safe havens.
74
 Unbeknownst to the Sailani 
brothers, several weeks earlier one of their critical vulnerabilities had 
come to light, and it would ultimately lead to their downfall.  
The Sailani brothers were native to the island of Basilan, and 
routinely returned there. Two weeks prior to their planned attack on the 
AFP base, a U.S. PSYOP team, Marine Special Operations force, and 
civil affairs team executed a series of civil-military and security 
assistance events with their AFP counterparts on the island of Basilan 
near the Sailani brothers’ home village. The village was only a few 
miles from the AFP-U.S. medical outreach event, and the Sailanis’ 
home village inhabitants were in attendance. Novelty items and 
information handouts were given to attendees during the event as part 
of the PSYOP mission. The handouts included information on the 
brothers’ links to past ASG attacks and identified a reward for 
information leading to their capture. While AFP and U.S. PSYOP 
soldiers mingled and casually engaged attendees in conversation or 
translated for other U.S. forces supporting the event, two locals 
Filipinos approached asking about the rewards program. After several 
minutes of conversation, the two men specifically asked about the 
reward for the Sailani brothers. The ability of the U.S. team to speak 
local dialects and reassure the men that the rewards program was a 
legitimate U.S.-sponsored program solidified their willingness to work 
with the AFP Marines in providing information on the Sailani brothers’ 
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known local safe houses.
75
 This information would later prove vital in 
closing the net around the Sailani brothers as they fled back to Basilan.  
As the timeframe for the ASG attack against the AFP 
headquarters drew closer, U.S. and AFP sources confirmed the Sailani 
brothers were present somewhere within the Muslim neighborhoods of 
the city. The brothers were allegedly planning a combined vehicle and 
personnel infiltration attack against the AFP base that bordered several 
Muslim neighborhoods. Reports of an IED supply shipment and 
stockpile into the city mounted, making an attack appear increasingly 
imminent within the next 48 to 72 hours. 
The PSYOP detachment initiated a plan to disrupt the attack. In 
coordination with AFP PSYOP and intelligence personnel, local police 
forces, and their contacts, more than 75,000 rewards and other 
disruption messages and products that targeted the Sailani brothers 
were disseminated throughout select Muslim neighborhoods in the city 
of Zamboanga. The JSOTF’s PSYOP detachment developed and 
produced the Sailani products for the AFP operation, and further 
reinforced it with wide-area messaging through text messages and radio 
commercials. As the JSOTF-P PSYOP detachment’s AFP counterparts 
and contacts began to circulate within the Muslim neighborhoods, they 
were reinforced with text messages written in local dialects citing past 
atrocities of the Sailani brothers and reward values for their capture. 
The AFP also spread the word the two brothers were suspects linked to 
the highly publicized Jolo co-op bombing the year prior, further 
alienating the brothers from the local Muslim communities. Within 48 
hours of the AFP’s and JSOTF-P’s influence efforts, intelligence 
reports indicated a shift in ASG plans. The attack was reportedly 
delayed or canceled, and the Sailani brothers were confirmed as having 
left the city for the island of Basilan less than 10 miles away.  
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The Sailani brothers’ luck then ran out. The locals who 
recognized them on the “Wanted” handouts from the Basilan MEDCAP 
earlier in the month contacted AFP Marine and U.S. PSYOP personnel 
with information on their return. The men and other locals provided 
vital information leading to a successful AFP operation against the two 
ASG leaders. The AFP, supported by local village militia, executed a 
nighttime raid on the Sailani brothers’ safe house. After firing on AFP 
forces that were attempting to arrest them, both brothers were killed, 





IV. Alternating Effort to Maximize Influence 
Effects 
 
These three vignettes of JSOTF-P Influence Operations provide 
a brief summary of the thousands of hours and hundreds of Filipino and 
American civilian and military personnel working to counter the 
insurgency in the southern Philippines. The operational examples 
identify several of the methods SOF applies within Influence 
Operations to affect terrorist and insurgent networks in special warfare 
environments. The exploitation of critical nodes and vulnerabilities 
directly led to the disruption and degradation of insurgent aggression. 
JSOTF-P, alongside the AFP, applied successful influence methods to 
prevent a repeat of a population uprising against the AFP and the 
Philippine government. SOF’s Special Forces, PSYOP, NSW, 
MARSOC, and civil affairs maneuver elements, including intelligence 
and other enablers, combined to shape the human domain against 
insurgent activity. As a result, the terrorists’ own families shifted 
dispositions, resulting in a loss of ASG cohesion. 
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JSOTF-P improved the security environment by enhancing 
AFP military training and capabilities while facilitating offensive 
operations against insurgent targets. The effects, activities, and actions 
of joint special operations forces, supported by U.S. Navy and Air 
Force conventional elements, serves as an example of how SOF 
Influence Operations can successfully affect the human domain to 
mobilize against insurgent and terrorist elements that operate within 
indigenous populations and exploit them. As proven in previous 
conflicts, the impact of living and operating with host-nation 
counterparts as military advisors, conducting operational support, 
intelligence support, and other support actions, is immeasurable. The 
combined efforts of both the U.S. and the AFP played a pivotal role in 
changing the socio-cultural environment, which in turn subverted ASG 
and JI support and freedom of maneuver. 
Focusing on the conflict’s decisive points—population support 
mechanisms and the human domain—and subverting the insurgents’ 
ability to solicit and coerce support from the population proved the 
most effective and enduring means of attacking terrorist and insurgent 
critical vulnerabilities. Influencing the human domain increases 
favorable operating conditions for both U.S. and responsible host-
nation forces. Conventionally trained forces are typically used in 
displays of force, brinksmanship, and large-scale combat actions. 
Because of these traditional missions, most national-level militaries are 
not readily aligned and trained to apply unconventional and irregular 
methods to defeat subnational groups and nonstate actors. Highly 
specialized and regionally expert U.S. Special Operations Forces 
invested years in developing the operational and social environments 
within the conflicted areas of the southern Philippines. Those 
investments resulted in significant gains in countering and reversing 
ASG and JI momentum.  
The disposition of the population, the human domain, in a 
contested or adversary-controlled region is the center of gravity in 
irregular conflicts. Presented with the appropriate incentives, 
opportunities for trust, dedicated security, and livelihood alternatives, 
the populace will often make sufficient choices that will adversely 
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impact terrorists and insurgent forces. Likewise, the population’s 
choice against terrorist and insurgent forces empowers the host nation 
to regain the support that was previously at risk. 
Other key factors that emerge from these vignettes include the 
following:  
 There is no substitute for building trust and legitimacy with 
host-nation forces. This requires patience, respect, and a continued 
presence—living, eating, and operating with your counterparts for 
prolonged periods. The operating environment in JSOTF-P 
permitted this approach and remains one of the most significant 
variables in current and future irregular and unconventional 
conflicts. 
 Sustaining influence messages with supporting deeds and 
synchronizing Influence Operations with our counterparts was 
vital. Continuity of effort coupled with continuity of personnel 
were key enabling factors.  
 The synchronized and deliberate approach to message, 
messenger, and medium applied by the AFP and JSOTF-P 
maneuver forces increasingly improved access and acceptance as 
operations expanded to other islands and provinces. Success built 
on success, and momentum did not falter. Persistent, sustained 
presence and strategy was vital. 
 The ability of U.S. Special Forces and PSYOP operators to 
speak local dialects established rapport and legitimacy, and 
provided immediate unfiltered feedback on initiatives.  
 The legitimacy and trustworthiness of U.S. forces helped to 
build the legitimacy and trustworthiness of AFP forces and build 
confidence that the AFP was willing to deliver on their promises. 
The AFP’s ability to assume the lead and maintain the influence 
temp was critical to long-term success.  
 
V. The Future of Influence Operations 
Recalling that Influence Operations should be the predominant 
focus in counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, and irregular 
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warfare environments, some would argue that Influence Operations are 
a supporting effort to conventional stability operations. This may be 
true if the operational goal is to accomplish a quick kinetic defeat and 
withdraw U.S. efforts from the region. However, given the increasingly 
irregular character of contemporary warfare, the ability of the U.S. to 
limit itself to short-duration conflict in the near future is unlikely. It is 
more likely that the United States will continue to engage in protracted 
conflicts in underdeveloped countries, thereby necessitating continued 
proficiency in unconventional and irregular operations. The 
conventional mindset of destroying the enemy without addressing the 
effects on the population contradicts the idea of long-term stability, as 
both the destruction from combat and the suppression of any segments 
of the population will surely lead to further discontent.
77
 This mindset 
assumes that destruction of the enemy is accomplished quickly in a 
kinetic manner and oversight of the population is necessary through the 
presence of a superior security force for a limited period. One need 
only look to events in Iraq, Georgia, and the Ukraine as examples. 
However, the unconventional mindset of influencing the population to 
enable you to destroy the enemy establishes a basis for building a 
durable and attainable environment of local and regional stability and is 
also applicable within a larger conventional conflict.
78
  
The conventional mindset of stability operations focuses on 
“controlling” the population by providing basic human needs and a 
democratic government, thereby giving the population an alternative to 
supporting the insurgency. This is a flawed assumption, as basic human 
needs and the definition of democracy and responsible governance 
varies drastically throughout the world. Classic stability operations also 
do not take into account the ambiguity and requisite decades-long 
duration of the operation. Too often unrealistic time-driven benchmarks 
are set for neutralizing the adversary, establishing security, and handing 
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the mission over to a host nation that has not yet developed the capacity 
to maintain it. Trying to “kill all the terrorists” (a common 
parochialism) will only serve to create more insurgents and prolong 
hostilities. Adversaries are increasingly politically and ideologically 
driven, socially embedded, and capable of affecting local populations 
for recruitment and other resources.
79
 Doctrinally, stability operations 
seek to produce long-term results and require thorough joint and 
interagency cooperation, but do not necessarily require or incorporate 
cultural understanding. 
Understanding the human domain and stakeholder interests is 
essential to both sides of a conflict. In the affected nation, the relevant 
population will generally choose the side that provides them with the 
greatest stability. For the executors of special warfare operations, 
requisite degrees of cultural understanding, professional maturity, and 
patience are inextricably linked to the degree and speed of success. It is 
incumbent on the executing forces to influence the relevant population 
to align themselves with their responsible, representative, and 
legitimate government. There is no manual or all-encompassing model 
that serves as a lock-step method for success. As with any operation, 
the commander synchronizing Influence Operations is responsible for 
providing clarity on the employment method for his forces. The most 
critical guidance addresses when kinetic or non-kinetic missions 
assume the lead role in operations, as well as when and which core 
capability assumes the main effort and key supporting-effort 
responsibilities. In irregular conflicts, the influence LOO is the 
underlying approach that enables the command’s overall effort to 
achieve long-term stability. The main effort will most likely be aligning 
the population through effective messages and activities, as well as 
building the host nation’s capacity to operate effectively in an 
autonomous role.  
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A. Preparing SOF as the Executors of Influence Operations 
The most effective way to prepare any force to operate in an 
ambiguous environment is to conduct realistic and adaptive training. 
This allows leaders to plan and train for the most likely contingencies, 
rather than attempting to broadly apply conventional training to all 
scenarios. Theater security cooperation plan events provide excellent 
opportunities to train with host-nation partners and exchange lessons 
learned from several theaters before a crisis occurs. Additionally, these 
events provide a venue for building strong relationships between 
partner-nation militaries and conducting influence area assessments to 
support future operations. Units that are regionally specialized must 
incorporate and maintain proficiency in regional culture and language 
training. Understanding that it is not possible to prepare for every crisis 
(i.e., learning all cultures and languages), all SOF units must direct 
some focus on working through interpreters, understanding 
insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations, understanding civil 
infrastructure, and appreciating the multiple roles and responsibilities 
within Influence Operations and special warfare. Establishing baseline 
proficiency leads to productive relationships with the host nation and 
fellow Special Operations forces. 
An essential facet of adaptation is cultural expertise. Cultural 
awareness and willingness to engage in strange and unfamiliar 
situations are critical to gaining credibility and trust, and therefore to 
achieving and maintaining legitimacy. Major General (Ret.) Robert 
Scales, Jr. notes that “every young soldier should receive cultural and 
language instruction, not to make every soldier a linguist but to make 
every soldier a diplomat with enough sensitivity and linguistic skills to 
understand and converse with the indigenous citizen on the street.”
80
 
SOF soldiers receive rigorous interactive cultural and language 
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instruction as a matter of baseline training. These are core skills for 
SOF organizational mission sets, specifically FID, COIN, and UW. 
However, while a solid understanding of (and appreciation for) 
indigenous language and culture provides a collective knowledge base, 
a significant amount of planning, analysis, and synchronization is 
required to achieve influence superiority. 
Leaders must assess long-range and emerging threats and 
develop adaptive flexible policies to account for the uniqueness of each 
area of operation (down to the neighborhood level), to include 
intelligence and information sharing. While Moore’s Law dictates that 
technology will change, basic human nature will not.
81
 There will 
always be a need to revert to the most basic of tactics, techniques, and 
procedures in order to support and develop capacity in countries that 
have scarce resources. Overreliance on technology in an attempt to 
offset a lack of understanding toward the AOR’s human domain will 
only result in failure. Technology should serve primarily to augment 
sound operating principles, enhance tactical advantages, and exploit the 
adversary’s seams and gaps. Intelligence focused on the human domain 
is paramount. Intelligence professionals must adapt to the dynamic 
nature of Influence Operations and develop a firm foundation in the 
basics so they can become “adaptive soldiers” that provide the most 




Influence Operations require a deliberate focus to fuse SOF’s 
distinctive core competencies. Although the term influence is 
frequently used in contemporary policy and plans, its scope and 
relevance are rarely encapsulated and incorporated. A commonly 
accepted doctrine will assist in categorizing operations, providing 
commanders and staffs with planning direction, and establishing 
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realistic training requirements based on a common understanding of the 
mission scope. Incorporating Influence Operations into U.S. Army 
Special Warfare and joint doctrine will facilitate institutional 
understanding and combine the expertise of SOF’s distinctive core 
competencies to achieve a common objective. Operating as a synergetic 
force that adapts and cycles the main and supporting efforts to mission 
requirements is necessary for conducting Influence Operations 
effectively and efficiently in the application of special warfare. 
 
B. Conclusion 
As noted in the introduction, as the irregular warfare landscape 
continues to evolve, so the demand for using an Influence Operations 
approach continues to expand. In addition to countering and defeating 
an insurgency and terrorist threat, influence operations are equally 
applicable against hostile host-nation states that sponsor insurgencies, 
terrorist groups, and/or oppress and manipulate their own population. 
These methods are adaptable with a variety of options for U.S. forces in 
or around the area of operations to affect an insurgency or hostile 
nation state through their own populations. This approach can help 
disrupt the ability of the hostile state, insurgents, and terrorists to 
oppress a population, threaten regional stability, and endanger U.S. 
national interests. There are exploitable vulnerabilities and advantages 
for us to use Influence Operations to affect a hostile nation state from 
within when that nation is itself an oppressive and subversive regime. 
Moreover, when the hostile state is engaging in irregular warfare by 
sponsoring insurgencies within its regional neighbors, our Influence 
Operation advantages grow exponentially.  
Long-term success is ultimately dependent on coordinated 
strategic efforts to solidify the gains made by operators on the ground. 
If the strategic focus is not fully aligned with the tactical and 
operational conditions, successes within target populations will be 
short-lived. Influence Operations are key components of special 
warfare, but they require the strategic endurance to achieve long-term 
strategic objectives. This is essential to solidify accomplishments on 
the ground and not undermine operations. Statements and actions that 
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facilitate a perception of indecisiveness or lack of dedication, such as 
withdraw dates, force constraints, rules of engagement exposures, and 
so on, undermine the credibility and influence capabilities of the 
operators working in support of national objectives. The 
synchronization of tactical, operational, and strategic endeavors will 
reduce operational costs for logistical support, infrastructure 
investment, and lives lost. When initiated in the early stages of an 
insurgency or budding conflict, dedicated Influence Operations can 
aggressively and proactively shape the operational environment and 
prevent the situation from escalating into a prolonged, costly, and 
controversial conflict. 
Consistency in Influence Operations is essential. It begins with 
how our influence messages and deeds are developed, planned, 
interwoven, and employed for specific target audiences to achieve an 
overarching desired effect or outcome. In our experience, Influence 
Operations were most successful when they were able to balance the 
need to defeat the insurgents’ ability to grow, undermined their ability 
to sustain their activities, and increased the degree of trust between 
local populations and government/military representatives. To be sure, 
this is a challenge, but Influence Operations are a continuous endeavor 
with not only constant incursions by hostile actors but also daily events 
within the population that can counter those stories or distract the 
audience. Maintaining, competing, responding, reinforcing, or 
countering competing efforts is the norm and requires an adaptive and 
dynamic core of operators and resources to be successful.  
Some of our key measures of effectiveness were unique:  
 unsolicited reporting of armed group activities;  
 expanding access into previously non-permissive communities;  
 attempts to destroy influence signs and poster products;  
 armed groups reluctance to attack MEDCAPs;  
 children trading comic book pages;  
 threats to radio and TV stations broadcasting commercials. 
These unique measures of effectiveness were reinforced by 
more traditional measures such as tips called in from previously silent 
populations, local militias providing support for government forces, 
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and high-value targets captured or killed. The net result over this period 
of time was also tangible: multiple lines of operation curtailed the 
ability of the most-wanted leadership of various armed groups to evade 
detection, and new access to previously closed communities help to 
undermine the ability of armed groups to subvert local communities 
and the national government.
83
  
Influence Operations are not a new form of operations. Key 
elements that resulted in success link directly back to the very roots of 
Special Operations core skill sets: language skills that allow trust to 
develop; patient and persistent presence that allow relationships to be 
formed and nurtured; tailoring messages to the nuances of a 
microculture; attention to detail and to local sensitivities; continuous 
adaptability; and the willingness to include nontraditional groups, 
perspectives, and approaches to solve a problem in a dynamic 
environment.  
All operations have an inherent influence effect. Influence 
Operations are deliberate and synergistically focused efforts that are 
interwoven across a command’s other lines of operation. They are 
applied using an overall theme to influence a target group for the 
purpose of accomplishing political, military, and/or regional goals. 
Understanding the culture, constantly engaging in capacity-building 
activities with the population, and enabling the host-nation government 
to become independently effective are critical to long-term regional 
success. Regardless of the environment, the success of any Influence 
Operation hinges on the ability to favorably affect the human domain 
and adequately eliminate active and tacit population support to the 
enemy.  
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 JSOTF-P PSYOP Operational Detachment Activities (U), August 2006. 
These efforts complemented an increase in maritime interdiction operations by 
AFP and U.S. NSW forces, Army Special Forces initiatives with the AFP, and 







1. How do Influence Operations differ from stability operations?  
2. What SOF attributes and skill sets—core competencies—
support the conduct of Influence Operations?  
3. The authors argue: “Synergy between all partners is a must for 
effective Influence Operations.” If this is NOT maintained, what 
could then be the result?  
4. What strategies can be used to disseminate key Influence 
Operations themes and messages to their target audiences? What 
are some of the measures of success? 




1. Which groups and individuals should we focus on when 
thinking about Influence Operations activities? Why? What does 
this suggest about how and where to direct development, 
infrastructure, and education resources? 
2. Trust is an essential element in successful Influence 
Operations. In conflict zones, what effective initiatives can rebuild 
trust with the local populace? What can undermine that trust? How 
can setbacks be addressed? 
3. In conducting Influence Operations, what are the most critical 
activities to focus on in order to achieve long-term regional 
stability and denial of insurgent safe havens? Who should take the 
lead in conducting these activities? Why? 
4. What insurgent vulnerabilities or centers of gravity are most 
important to focus on? Why? How did this alter the strategy of 
armed groups in this case study? What measures of progress are 





Application of Influence Operations by Adversaries 
1. Do our adversaries—state actors or armed groups—conduct 
Influence Operations? If so, what can we learn from them? 
2. What can we learn from how armed groups such as Hezbollah 
or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) use influence 
operations?  
3. Are these operations considered successful by these groups? If 
so, what accounts for their success? 
4. How have armed groups used psychological warfare in their 
Influence Operations?  
5. How do armed groups combine kinetic and non-kinetic 
activities to achieve operational and strategic goals? 







Appendix A: Threat Groups in the Philippines 
 
The Abu Sayyaf Group
84
 (Arabic for “Bearer of the Sword,” or 
ASG, formerly known as Al-Harakatul al-Islamiya
85
), most notoriously 
known for brutal kidnappings, beheadings, bombings, assassinations 
and extortion was founded by Abdurajak Janjalani, after the ASG split 
from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1991.
86
 The Philippine 
National Police killed Janjalani, the first leader of ASG, in 1998. Their 
professed ideology is to establish an independent theocratic Islamic 
state in Mindanao
87
, though the group has consistently demonstrated 
“no willingness to negotiate a political settlement.”
88
 While this may 
have been the driving focus under Janjalani, a seasoned mujahidin 
fighter who fought in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation, the 
current remnants of the group primarily engage in criminal actions and 
terrorism to discredit the government and fund their cause. ASG 
leadership and ranks have suffered great losses in the past few years at 
the hands of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), but still share 
some collective goals with other violent extremist organizations like 
Jema’ah Islamiy’ah. 
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Maria Ressa, and Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror, by 
Zachary Abuza. 
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 Zachary Abuza, “Balik Islam: The Return of Abu Sayyaf” (information 
paper, Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute), 2. 
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 (“Islamic Community,” or JI) is a jihadi 
Islamist Southeast Asian terrorist network, based in Indonesia and 
established by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 1993 
when they broke from Darul Islam.
90
 While JI remains independent 
from al-Qaeda, it has strong affiliations as JI is led by mujahidin
91
 who 
have served in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
92
 JI has suffered severe losses 
of their leadership and recruiting freedom of movement due to 
increased pressure from Indonesian and Philippine Security Forces. 
However, their goal of establishing a sovereign Muslim state continues 
to unite them (internally and with elements of the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front), and serves as a catalyst when recruiting from the 
Southern Philippines, Sabah (Malaysia) and other remote areas of 
Southeast Asia. 
 
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
93
 is a belligerent 
organization in the Southern Philippines that also seeks to establish an 
independent Islamic state. The MILF broke away from the Moro 
National Liberation Front
94
 (MNLF, the current political party that 
administrates the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao [ARMM]) 
citing ideological differences. The group continues to engage in anti-
government rhetoric and violent acts, while recruiting from Mindanao 
to bolster its considerable ranks.  
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Radical Islamism in Indonesia, by Greg Barton, and Militant Islam in 
Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror, by Zachary Abuza. 
90
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Australia: UNSW Press, 2004), 113. 
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 Mujahidin are Muslim fighters, or those engaged in jihad (holy 
struggle)(Barton, 115). 
92
 Barton, 113. 
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 For a detailed history of the MILF, see Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion 
in Mindanao, by Marites Danguilan Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria. 
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 (Tagalog for “Return to Islam”) is a countrywide 
underground movement to convert Christians to Islam, on the 
questionable basis that all Filipinos were originally Muslim before the 
Catholic Spanish colonized the Philippines. The movement is generally 
peaceful, though the ASG and MILF have capitalized on the beliefs of 
some of these new members and conducted successful recruiting. 





Kidnap for Ransom Gangs (KFRG) are prevalent in the 
southern Philippines, and often affiliate themselves with the MILF or 
ASG (though either rarely recognizes them). The ASG has historically 
used some of these gangs for their area expertise, human contacts, 





Other: There are many other smaller Islamist groups that 
contribute to the overall threat to stability in the Philippines, like the 
Misuari Breakaway Group (MBG) and Rajah Solaiman Movement 
(RSM). The New People’s Army (NPA) is not Islamist at all, but rather 
the militant wing of the Communist Peoples’ Party of the Philippines. 
Also known as the Communist Terrorist Movement, their goals are 
entirely different but many of their methods (i.e. delegitimizing the 
government, recruiting from the population, etc.) similarly contribute to 
regional instability.
98
 As stated by the Philippine Government on 
                                                        
95
 For more on the Balik Islam movement, see “Balik Islam: The Return of the 
Abu Sayyaf,” by Zachary Abuza. 
96
 Abuza, “Balik Islam,”  ix. 
97
 The authors refer to the 2005 example of ASG’s Isnilon Hapilon’s group 
attempting to move through the Daguma Mountain Range on Mindanao by 
using the Abu Suffia KFRG for food and shelter and as guides. The Abu 
Suffia gang has since been eliminated by Philippine Security Forces. 
98
 The NPA represents one of the greatest threats to the Philippine government 
due to their strong organization, numbers, recruiting, and offensive capability. 
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countless occasions throughout past decades, the NPA represents one 
of the greatest threats to internal security in the Philippines since its 
establishment in 1969. 
                                                                                                                         
It is one of the few organizations that are capable of physically attacking (to 
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